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PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 
AND PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS 
Alan Schwartz* & Robert E. Scott** 
For decades, there has been substantial uncertainty regarding when the law will impose 
precontractual liability. The confusion is partly due to scholars' failure to recover the 
law in action governing precontractual iability issues. In this Article, Professors 
Schwartz and Scott show first that no liability attaches for representations made during 
preliminary negotiations. Courts have divided, however, over the question of liability 
when parties make reliance investments following a "preliminary agreement." A number 
of modern courts impose a duty to bargain in good faith on the party wishing to exit 
such an agreement. Substantial uncertainty remains, however, regarding when this duty 
attaches and what the duty entails. Professors Schwartz and Scott develop a model 
showing that parties create preliminary agreements rather than complete contracts when 
their project can take a number of forms and the parties are unsure which form will 
maximize profits. A preliminary agreement allocates investment asks between the 
parties, specifies investment timing, and commits the parties only to pursue a profitable 
project. Parties sink costs in the project because investment accelerates the realization 
of returns and illuminates whether any of the possible project types would be profitable 
to pursue. A party to a preliminary agreement "breaches" when it delays its investment 
beyond the time the agreement specifies. Delay will save costs for this party if no project 
turns out to be profitable and will improve this party's bargaining power in any 
negotiation to a complete contract. Delay often disadvantages the promisee, and when 
parties anticipate such strategic behavior, they are less likely to make preliminary 
agreements. This disincentive is unfortunate because a preliminary agreement often is a 
necessary condition to the realization of a socially efficient opportunity. Thus, contract 
law should encourage relation-specific investments in preliminary agreements by 
awarding the promisee his verifiable reliance if the promisor has strategically delayed 
investment. Professors Schwartz and Scott study a large sample of appellate cases 
showing that: (i) parties appear to make the preliminary agreements described in the 
model and breach for the reasons the model identifies, and (2) courts sometimes protect 
the promisee's reliance interest when they should, but the courts' imperfect 
understanding of the parties' behavior sometimes leads them to err. 
I. Introduction 
at least fifty ears, a particular pattern of commercial behavior 
has engendered considerable litigation and substantial scholarly 
commentary. Two commercial parties agree to attempt a transaction 
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and agree also on the nature of their respective contributions, but nei- 
ther the transaction or what the parties are to do is precisely de- 
scribed, and neither may be written down. The parties do not agree 
and, indeed, may never have attempted to agree on important terms 
such as the price. After the parties agree upon what they can, and be- 
fore uncertainty is resolved, one or both of them make a sunk-cost in- 
vestment.1 This pattern of commercial behavior suggests that the par- 
ties have made a "preliminary agreement" that will have one of two 
legally significant outcomes: If the transaction turns out to be profit- 
able after uncertainty is resolved, the parties will make their agree- 
ment more concrete and then conduct the transaction. But if the 
transaction turns out to be unprofitable, the parties will abandon the 
project. Disputes sometimes arise under these preliminary agreements 
after one or both of the parties have invested. One party may then 
abandon the project even though the other party protests the first 
party's exit. In particular, the disappointed party believes that he is 
entitled to compensation either for his expectation or for his invest- 
ment cost while the other party believes that she is entitled to exit 
without liability. A court must then decide whether to protect he 
promisee's2 expectation interest, or to protect his reliance interest by 
reimbursing his sunk cost, or to award him nothing. 
Legal scholars and practicing lawyers have poorly understood these 
types of cases. This is partly because the legal doctrines invoked in 
preliminary agreement cases are also used to support unrelated claims 
of precontractual liability.3 As a consequence, the governing criteria 
when reliance on a preliminary agreement is an issue have been ob- 
1 A sunk-cost or relation-specific investment is one that is partly or totally nonredeployable. 
For example, steel rods ordered for a project are redeployable because a party can sell them on 
the market, whereas rods that are fabricated into particular shapes would not be redeployable if 
the shapes were specific to the contracting party's needs. 
2 For convenience, we refer to the party who seeks damages or seeks to continue the deal as 
the promisee. 
3 The legal rules that have evolved to treat claims of precontractual liability travel under a 
confusing array of legal doctrines. Courts are typically asked to protect the promisee's reliance on 
the enforceability of an incomplete bargain against the alleged promisor's insistence that no con- 
tract had been made. The promisee typically invokes multiple grounds for relief, including mis- 
representation, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, implied contract, and breach of an obliga- 
tion to bargain in good faith. These arguments often, but not always, fail. Traditional scholars 
ask whether courts correctly apply the various legal doctrines on which promisees base their 
claims for relief. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agree- 
ments: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987). More recently, law 
and economics scholars ask whether it would be efficient to award damages to the promisee. See, 
e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 
(2001); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996); 
Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Con- 
tract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385 (1999); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Eco- 
nomics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249 (1996). 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.75 on Thu, 28 Jan 2016 19:34:26 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
664 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:661 
scured. The first ask, therefore, is to characterize more precisely the 
commercial patterns and the associated legal rules that control precon- 
tractual liability. 
Parties have made a "fully binding contract" when they have 
agreed on all material terms and memorialized their agreement in a fi- 
nal written document. If the parties have not yet reached a fully bind- 
ing contract, their negotiations will fall into one of three categories. 
First, the parties have engaged in "preliminary negotiations" when 
they have discussed a deal but have not agreed to one. In this event, 
the disappointed party can recover nothing.4 Second, the parties have 
agreed on all material terms and intend to memorialize this agreement 
in a formal document. In the interval between agreement and memo- 
rialization, the promisor has had a change of heart. Courts treat this 
type of agreement as a fully binding contract when the evidence sup- 
ports a finding that the parties did not intend the formalization ftheir 
agreement to be essential.5 As is usual with binding contracts, courts 
protect he promisee's expectation interest. Third, the parties have 
made a preliminary agreement as defined above when they have 
agreed on certain terms but left other terms open, so that the best in- 
ference from their negotiations is that they have made a binding pre- 
liminary commitment to pursue a profitable transaction.6 Here, the 
emerging legal rule requires parties to such preliminary agreements to 
bargain in good faith over open terms.7 Should the promisor - the 
party who prefers to exit - fail to bargain in good faith, she will be 
4 In the absence of sufficient evidence that the parties intended to be legally bound in some 
way, courts generally conclude that the parties have engaged merely in preliminary negotiations 
and do not impose liability for inducing reliance absent misrepresentation, express promise, or 
similar inducement. For a recent example, see PFT Roberson, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks North Amer- 
ica, Inc., 420 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2005). 
5 See, e.g., Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 547-48 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Gorodensky v. Mitsubishi Pulp Sales (MC) Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Dis- 
putes in which the parties agreed on all material terms but also agreed later to memorialize their 
agreement in a more formal document arise primarily because parties failed to express clearly 
their intention regarding when their arrangement would become legally enforceable. 
6 See, e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
7 This rule originated with the opinion of Judge Leval in Tribune. Currently, Judge Leval's 
framework is followed in at least thirteen states, sixteen federal district courts, and seven federal 
circuits. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. As for other countries, England does not 
award any remedy before a complete contract has been made. It is more common to impose a 
duty of good faith in conducting negotiations or, as in France, to regulate precontractual behavior 
under the law of torts. Liability for costs incurred is sometimes awarded under these rules, but 
apart from easy and unusual cases, such as when a party enters into negotiations and has no in- 
tention of making a contract, foreign law seems as uncertain and in need of guidance as U.S. law. 
For discussions of foreign precontractual liability regimes, see PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 
(Ewoud H. Hondius ed., 1991), and Paula Giliker, A Role for Tort in Pre-Contractual Negotia- 
tions? An Examination of English, French, and Canadian Law, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 969 
(2003). 
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liable for the promisee's reliance expenditures. The parties are not re- 
quired to agree to a deal, however, because their preliminary agree- 
ment does not commit hem to pursue an unprofitable project. 
In this Article, we ask whether the new rule governing these bind- 
ing preliminary commitments is justifiable. This normative question is 
unresolved because the positive question - why parties engage in 
these transactions - is also unresolved. A decisionmaker cannot regu- 
late a transaction intelligently without understanding why parties en- 
gage in the transaction. The behavioral pattern that is reflected in 
these preliminary agreements has never been plausibly explained. 
There are three open questions that must be answered. First, parties 
often write complete contracts - or contracts that are as complete as 
they can write - before they make relation-specific investments. Why 
do parties in this context make preliminary agreements? Second, al- 
though it sometimes i infeasible for parties to write a complete con- 
tract at the beginning of their relationship, it does not follow that they 
must sink costs in what may turn out to be an unprofitable venture. A 
common alternative is to delay contracting until the ex post state of 
the world becomes clear. Why do these parties invest after making the 
preliminary agreement but before uncertainty is resolved? Third, par- 
ties would not invest in this interval unless the expected value of in- 
vestment were positive. However, investments are sunk when uncer- 
tainty dissipates, so the fact of investment will not cause the parties to 
pursue a deal that will lose money. If both parties realize that exit is 
best, how, then, can one of them have a reasonable expectation that 
the other will reimburse his sunk costs in the absence of a specific 
promise?8 
Our Article is the first o address these three questions as a set.9 
Parties make a preliminary agreement because they cannot write a 
complete contract at the outset: they function in a complex environ- 
ment in which a profitable project can take a number of forms, and 
just which form will work, if any, is unknown at the start. The parties 
8 Litigated preliminary agreements do not settle the issue of reimbursement for sunk costs 
when deals are abandoned. 
9 In his interesting article, Avery Katz posits that parties rely early because the value of a 
contemplated project declines over time, but the parties do not contract because an exogenous 
event, such as an unexpected increase in production costs, makes contracting infeasible or uneco- 
nomical. See Katz, supra note 3, at 1267-68, 1292. The parties, however, could have written a
force majeure clause that would regulate their affairs if the event occurs. Also, Professor Katz 
implicitly assumes that reliance is verifiable to a court; otherwise, a court could not protect the 
promisee's reliance interest. But if parties expect that reliance will be verifiable, they can contract 
on reliance initially: that is, the promisor can purchase the promisee's investment by agreeing to 
compensate him if a deal turns out to be impossible. In Lucian Bebchuk and Omri Ben-Shahar's 
model, reliance also is verifiable, see Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 3, at 436; therefore, the 
parties also can contract on reliance initially. Moreover, their model does not explain why the 
parties rely before uncertainty is resolved. 
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invest in the interim period because early investment accelerates the 
realization of returns. The sooner the widget factory is built, the ear- 
lier profits will be realized. More importantly, investment clarifies 
what type of project could succeed. For example, an investment in 
learning market conditions may reveal which type of widget is likely to 
sell. Thus, time reveals the state of the world in which any project 
must be pursued, and investment provides increased knowledge about 
a project's prospects. This combination makes a profitable project 
sufficiently tangible to support a complete contract. Preliminary 
agreements hus commonly are exploratory; that is, the performance of 
a preliminary agreement sometimes i a necessary condition for parties 
to pursue an efficient project later.10 
To illustrate how a promisee can have a justifiable grievance, we 
later show that in some deals expected surplus would be maximized if 
the parties invested sequentially, while in other deals surplus would be 
maximized if the parties invested simultaneously.11 An efficient pre- 
liminary agreement o invest simultaneously may be unstable, how- 
ever. The promisor has an incentive to defect from any such agree- 
ment by delaying her decision whether to invest until after the 
promisee has invested. The promisor benefits from defection if the 
project turns out to be unprofitable because she will not have sunk 
costs in a losing deal. Alternatively, if the project turns out to be prof- 
itable, the parties' complete contract will compensate the promisor for 
the investment costs the project requires her to make, but the contract 
will not reimburse the promisee for costs he already incurred.12 Defec- 
tion from a preliminary agreement to invest simultaneously thus dis- 
advantages the promisee. We therefore characterize a promisor's de- 
10 The model we analyze thus attempts to answer, in the context of preliminary agreements, an 
important contract theory question: "What can contracts achieve when actions are contractable x 
post but not ex ante, especially in 'complex' environments?" PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS 
Dewatripont, Contract Theory 572 (2005). 
11 The phrases "simultaneous investment" and "sequential investment" are partly metaphoric. 
The model applies whenever both parties' investments are needed to make a project successful 
but one of the parties has a greater ability than the other to delay a material portion of her work. 
12 After the promisee's investment is sunk and the parties learn that the project will be suc- 
cessful, they will bargain to divide the expected gains from the project. At this point, if the pro- 
misor refuses to pay for the promisee's costs, the promisee's options are to exit and receive none of 
his costs, or to accept a share of the expected gain and thus recover some or all of them. The 
promisee's threat to exit unless his investment costs are reimbursed is not credible, however. The 
promisor will recognize that it would be irrational for the promisee to exit, and so she will refuse 
to pay for the sunk investment costs. In contrast, the promisor has a credible threat to exit unless 
the bargain compensates her for costs she has yet to incur. If she exits, her payoff will be zero 
rather than the negative sum of her uncompensated costs. Thus, the ex post bargain, when the 
promisee invests first, will reimburse only the promisor's costs. We develop the implications of 
this conclusion in the model below. 
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fection as a breach, and promisees can reasonably expect their promi- 
sors not to breach. 
It is efficient for contract law to protect the promisee's reliance in- 
terest if his promisor deviated from an agreed investment sequence. A 
reliance recovery will encourage parties to make preliminary agree- 
ments and will deter some strategic behavior.13 Therefore, the new 
rule governing preliminary agreements - awarding the promisee reli- 
ance if the promisor fails to bargain in good faith but not requiring the 
parties to agree - is a step in the right direction. The law cannot pro- 
tect the promisee's expectation interest because, in the context hat we 
study, there is no complete contract to enforce.14 
The new legal rule is deficient, however, because it is unnecessary 
to require parties to bargain in good faith. As we show, efficiency 
would be enhanced if the law were simply to protect he promisee's re- 
liance interest. Further, even if the duty to bargain is thought o be 
justifiable, the cases do not indicate what the parties should bargain 
about. Rational parties will pursue efficient projects and abandon in- 
efficient projects. They will disagree, if at all, over whether a party 
should be compensated for a reliance expense. If they disagree, 
they may call upon a court to resolve the dispute, and it should deter- 
mine whether a promise to invest simultaneously has been breached 
and, if so, what fraction of the injured party's reliance should be 
reimbursed.15 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we examine a sample 
of cases involving early reliance investments in order to recover the 
law in action regarding precontractual liability. This Part shows that 
courts require some mutual intent o be bound before awarding any 
damages. Part III presents a model of the commercial pattern de- 
scribed above. We show how the model answers the three positive 
13 Sunk costs, we argue below, often become more tangible as projects proceed, and thus a 
portion of the promisee's reliance becomes verifiable. 
14 Since these disputes arise when one party refuses to proceed following a preliminary agree- 
ment, complete contracts do not exist in the appellate cases. See infra pp. 691-93. 
15 A promisor's refusal to discuss whether the parties should transact should not be a violation 
of the duty to bargain in good faith because the parties will transact when they ought to and will 
not transact otherwise. Further, as we discuss in section II. B, the cases are unclear regarding 
when parties have made a preliminary agreement. We argue in section III.D that a binding pre- 
liminary commitment should be found when the parties have agreed in broad terms on engaging 
in a joint project; have divided the investment asks, although on a high level of abstraction (for 
example, a division of tasks according to which John will prepare a construction site and Mary 
will locate a supplier); and, most importantly, have agreed on the rough order in which their in- 
vestments are to be made. This third requirement serves two functions. First, the promisor 
should not be held liable for delaying her investment unless the parties had agreed to invest si- 
multaneously. Hence, a court must be able to recover the parties' agreement regarding the timing 
of planned investments. Second, an agreement on the timing of investment is a good proxy for an 
intention to be legally bound: parties are unlikely to go so far if they have no such intention. 
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questions, and we formally derive the normative implications just 
summarized. Part IV compares the model with a sample of the lead- 
ing cases in order to evaluate the fit between our results and the com- 
mercial patterns revealed in court opinions and to consider how our 
normative recommendations could have been applied. Part V con- 
cludes and briefly highlights our principal result: courts can facilitate 
commercial behavior not only by enforcing complete contracts, but 
also by attaching legal significance to preliminary agreements. 
II. Recovering the Law of Preliminary Agreements 
A. Rethinking the Conventional Understanding 
of Precontractual Liability 
The conventional wisdom among contemporary scholars is that 
courts will sometimes impose liability for reliance investments under- 
taken before any agreement between the parties.16 Commentators 
identify as grounds for such enforcement the existence of unjust en- 
richment, misrepresentations made during negotiation, a specific prom- 
ise made and relied upon during the negotiation process, and a "gen- 
eral obligation arising out of the negotiations themselves."17 But even 
a casual survey of contemporary case law casts significant doubt on 
the accuracy of this conventional view. Courts actually make some 
form of agreement a necessary condition to a promisee's recovery. For 
courts, the real issues are when an agreement will be found and how 
the nature of the agreement will determine the type of damages a 
promisee can recover. 
Much of the confusion can be traced to the frequently taught case 
of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.18 Hoffman and Red Owl engaged 
in extensive negotiations and preparations aimed at Hoffman's open- 
ing a Red Owl franchise. In the course of these negotiations, Red Owl 
officials recommended that Hoffman take numerous financial and 
16 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt c (1981) ("Bad faith in 
negotiation . . . may be subject to sanctions."); RALPH B. LAKE & UGO DRAETTA, LETTERS OF 
Intent and Other Precontractual Documents 177 (2d ed. 1994) ("Liability for action 
during the precontractual stage of a transaction may be based on the obligation to bargain and to 
negotiate in good faith."); Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 222 ("[C]ourts have shown increasing will- 
ingness to impose precontractual liability. . . . [U]njust enrichment resulting from the negotiations, 
misrepresentation made during the negotiations, and specific promise[s] during the negotiations, 
have been recognized by courts . . . ."); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence 
of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 496 
(1983) ("[I]t is clear that promissory estoppel has been used to enforce promises too indefinite or 
incomplete to constitute valid offers."). 
17 Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 222; see also, e.g., id. at 229-43 (discussing these four bases for 
liability in detail). 
18 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). 
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nonfinancial actions. He followed these recommendations because the 
officials also assured him that $18,000 would be a sufficient capital in- 
vestment.19 Thereafter, Red Owl developed several financing propos- 
als, the last of which required Hoffman to contribute $34,000 of debt 
and equity. In response, Hoffman broke off negotiations and sued Red 
Owl to recover his sunk costs.20 The court held as a matter of law 
that the parties never reached agreement on essential factors necessary 
to establish a contract. For example, they had not agreed on any of 
the details concerning Red OwPs investment, such as the size, cost, de- 
sign, and layout of the store, nor had the parties agreed on the terms of 
the lease, including rent, maintenance, renewal, and franchisee pur- 
chase options.21 Indeed, the parties never agreed on just what was 
meant by the statement hat $18,000 of capital would be a sufficient 
investment o sustain a franchise.22 Thus, the court held, there could 
be no basis-of-the-bargain liability. Nevertheless, the court permitted 
Hoffman to recover sunk costs based on the doctrine of promissory es- 
toppel.23 The court held that under this doctrine, a promise - here 
Red Owl's assurances that $18,000 was a sufficient investment - need 
not be as definite in its terms as a promise that is the basis of a tradi- 
tional bargain contract.24 
There is scant support in the law of contracts for this legal analysis. 
To the contrary, the Restatement of Contracts has only one definition 
19 See id. at 268-69. 
20 See id. at 270-71. 
21 See id. at 274. 
22 The trial transcript in the Hoffman case shows that the parties' minds never met regarding 
the nature of the $18,000 that Hoffman was prepared to contribute. Red Owl assumed that the 
$18,000 would be equity and would be exclusive of any debt Hoffman might need to incur to sus- 
tain operations at the outset of the new franchise. Hoffman assumed, however, that $18,000 
would be his total contribution of equity and debt combined. The Wisconsin Supreme Court did 
not refer to this misunderstanding about the nature of the $18,000 investment. For further dis- 
cussion and an analysis of the Hoffman case itself, see Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl 
Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. LJ. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with 
the Harvard Law School Library), reprinted in CONTRACTS STORIES (Douglas G. Baird ed., 
forthcoming 2007). 
23 See Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 274-75. The court based its decision on section 90 of the first 
Restatement of Contracts. The differences between the first and second Restatement versions of 
section 90 are irrelevant o the question posed here: whether promissory estoppel can properly be 
invoked to enforce a preliminary representation that does not qualify as a specific promise. 
24 See id. at 275. Specifically, the court held: 
If promissory estoppel were to be limited to only those situations where the promise giv- 
ing rise to the cause of action must be so definite with respect to all details that a con- 
tract would result were the promise supported by consideration, then the defendants' in- 
stant promises to Hoffman would not meet this test. However, [section 90 of the 
Restatement] does not impose the requirement that the promise giving rise to the cause 
of action must be so comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer that 
would ripen into a contract if accepted by the promisee. 
Id. 
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of a promise, and that definition applies equally to a promise that is 
the product of a bargained-for exchange and a promise for which en- 
forcement is sought on the grounds of induced reliance.25 Thus, if 
Hoffman stands for the proposition that a commitment can be binding 
under a theory of promissory estoppel even though it lacks the clarity 
and certainty required of a bargained-for promise, the case is wrong as 
a matter of doctrine.26 More importantly, it is an outlier: the case has 
not been followed in its own or other jurisdictions.27 For example, a 
recent case applying the Wisconsin law that governed Hoffman refused 
25 The Restatement defines a promise as "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from 
acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment 
has been made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981). Section 90 refers to 
"promise" and defines it by reference to section 2. See id. § 90 reporter's note cmt. a. Several 
scholars have noted the weak doctrinal basis for the Hoffman decision, in particular the absence 
of a finding that Red Owl officials made any specific promise to Hoffman. See, e.g., CHARLES 
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 24 (1981) (arguing that Hoffman is best explained as liability 
for negligent misrepresentation); Mark P. Gergen, Liability for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 
S. Cal. L. Rev. i, 33-36 (1990) (same). 
26 Commentators offer alternative theories of liability that would support the Hoffman result. 
Some argue that the decision can be grounded in a duty to bargain in good faith. See, e.g., Greg- 
ory M. Duhl, Red Owl's Legacy, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 314-21 (2003); Charles L. Knapp, Enforc- 
ing the Contract To Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 686-90 (1969); Robert S. Summers, "Good 
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 
VA. L. Rev 195, 224-25 & n.115 (1968). This theory is undermined by the absence of any evi- 
dence of bad faith by Red Owl officers. Red Owl's agent was, at most, careless in not inquiring 
further about what Hoffman meant when he said he could contribute about $18,000. Hoffman, 
however, was much more careless because every Red Owl financial proposal listed Hoffman's 
$18,000 equity contribution as exclusive of any additional debt needed to sustain the franchise. 
The proposed cash requirements for the franchise increased over time, but the equity require- 
ments remained largely fixed; the additional proposals that required cash were loans that Hoff- 
man could have repaid if the larger estimated cash flow turned out not to be necessary to run the 
grocery business. 
A more plausible doctrinal claim for Hoffman might have been either for negligent misrep- 
resentation based on the theory that Red Owl officials carelessly represented that $18,000 of capi- 
tal would be adequate to support a franchise, or for unjust enrichment based on quasi-con tract 
because Hoffman, by his actions, gave Red Owl valuable information regarding his future pros- 
pects as a franchisee. There are many problems applying either of these theories to arm's-length 
bargaining contexts, however. Imposing liability for the casual statements and contacts that are 
prevalent in business could chill contracting. Hence, the majority rule imposes liability for negli- 
gent misrepresentation i  commercial contexts only when the party making the statement pos- 
sesses unique or specialized expertise or is in a special relationship of trust and confidence with 
the injured party such that the injured party was justified in relying on the misstatement. See, 
e.g., Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 187-90 
(2d Cir. 2004). Similarly, unjust enrichment claims rarely succeed unless the defendant specifi- 
cally and wrongfully induced the benefit. A claim for unjust enrichment "do[es] not lie simply 
because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown 
that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or 
unlawfully." First Nat'l Bank v. Ramier, 311 N.W. 502, 504 (Minn. 1981); accord Mon-Ray, Inc. 
v. Granite Re, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); see also Scott, supra note 22 
(manuscript at 23-27) (explaining that, under this rule, Hoffman cannot be justified as a recovery 
based on unjust enrichment). 
27 See Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 236-43. 
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to award reliance damages on a promissory estoppel claim under simi- 
lar facts; rather, the court required evidence that the defendant had 
wrongfully induced a benefit.28 Courts in other jurisdictions have es- 
tablished similarly strict limitations for imposing promissory liability 
based on representations made during the negotiation process.29 
In order to evaluate systematically how contemporary American 
courts treat reliance investments made before the parties have written 
a complete contract, we analyzed a sample of 105 cases litigated be- 
tween 1999 and 2003 that directly presented the issue of recovery for 
precontractual reliance.30 Our goal was to disaggregate the precon- 
tractual reliance cases by uncovering the commercial patterns that 
generated litigation and identifying the legal consequences courts at- 
tached to those patterns. 
The cases in our sample fell into four patterns, each of which pro- 
duced a different legal outcome. Thirty cases raised the issue of reli- 
ance in the absence of any agreement by the parties regarding terms. 
These cases thus posed the question whether the plaintiff could re- 
cover reliance costs even though the parties had not reached any 
agreement. The courts did not find liability, whether based on promis- 
sory estoppel or quantum meruit, in twenty-six, or approximately 87%, 
28 See Beer Capitol Distrib., Inc. v. Guinness Bass Imp. Co., 290 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2002) (ap- 
plying Wisconsin law in a diversity case and denying both promissory estoppel and unjust en- 
richment claims based on reliance during negotiations on the defendant's representation that it 
would recommend that the plaintiff be chosen as the exclusive distributor for the defendant's 
products in southeastern Wisconsin); see also Lake Mich. Contractors, Inc. v. Manitowoc Co., No. 
noo-CV-787, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9547, at *35~36 (W.D. Mich. May 21, 2002) (applying Wis- 
consin law and holding that the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim failed because the evidence 
regarding the parties' objective manifestations demonstrated that there was no meeting of the 
minds between the parties). 
29 For example, in R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984), the 
court underscored that the baseline requirement for a promissory estoppel claim for early reliance 
is a "clear and unambiguous promise; a reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom 
the promise is made; and an injury sustained by the party asserting the estoppel by reason of his 
reliance." Id. at 78 (quoting Ripple's of Clearview, Inc. v. Le Havre Assocs., 452 N.Y.S.2d 447, 
449 (App. Div. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In denying liability, the court found 
that "the entire history of the parties' negotiations made it plain that any promise or agreement 
. . . was conditional upon the signing of a written contract." Id. at 79; see also Advanced Marine 
Techs., Inc. v. Burnham Sec, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 375, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[The] plaintiff mani- 
festly cannot make an end run around [the defendant's] reservation against undertaking any legal 
obligation absent a signed contract by recharacterizing the contract claim as one of promissory 
estoppel."). 
30 We began the project in the spring of 2004 by examining all public case law databases for 
preliminary negotiation and preliminary agreement cases proceeding under the following theories 
of liability: promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, implied contract, indefiniteness, and intent to 
be bound. This initial search returned 280 cases. We then selected every other case to produce a 
sample of 140 cases. In 35 of these cases, precontractual reliance was only peripherally relevant 
to the outcome. Eliminating these cases produced the final sample of 105 cases. The sample rep- 
resented 29 state jurisdictions, 19 federal district courts, and 7 federal courts of appeals. 
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of the thirty preliminary negotiation cases.31 The case data thus show 
that, absent misrepresentation or deceit, there generally is no liability 
for inducing reliance investments during the negotiation process.32 In 
twenty-seven cases, the parties had agreed on some material terms, but 
the court nonetheless denied recovery for breach of contract because 
the parties had also indicated, either expressly or by implication, that 
they did not intend to be legally bound.33 Thirty-six cases turned on 
31 See, e.g., Keystone Land & Dev. Co. v. Xerox Corp., 353 F.30I 1070, 1073-75 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Beer Capitol Distrib., 290 F.30I at 880-81; Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento, S.A. v. Citibank, 
N.A., No. 03 Civ. 1537 (MBM), 2003 WL 23018888, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003); Lake Mich. 
Contractors, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9547, at *35~36; Detroit Tigers, Inc. v. Ignite Sports Media, 
LLC, 203 F. Supp. 2d 789, 799-800 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (remarking that promissory estoppel is "not 
intended to give a party to a negotiated commercial bargain a second bite at the apple in the 
event it fails to prove breach of contract" (quoting Prentice v. UDC Advisory Servs., Inc., 648 
N.E.2d 146, 150-51 (111. App. Ct. 1995)); Indus. Maxifreight Servs., LLC v. Tenneco Auto. Operat- 
ing Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 630, 635-36 (W.D. Mich. 2002); Braun v. CMGI, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 12328 
(WHP), 2001 WL 921170, at *n (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2001); Abt Assocs., Inc. v. JHPIEGO Corp., 
104 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536 (D. Md. 2000); Suncraft Techs., Inc. v. Zirkon Druckmaschinen GmbH, 
No. 99 C 1456, 2000 WL 283970, at *7 (N.D. 111. Mar. 10, 2000) ("It is difficult o find the degree 
of injustice necessary for recovery in estoppel when the promises incorporate so many contingen- 
cies and complexities and as a matter of sound business practice are to be formalized before the 
parties carry them out." (quoting Gruen Indus., Inc. v. Biller, 608 F.2d 274, 282 (7th Cir. 1979)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Harnischfeger Indus., Inc. 294 B.R. 47, 55-57 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2003); Consumer Incentive Servs. v. Memberworks Inc., No. CV990362655, 2003 WL 
23025623, at *8-9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2003); Auerbach v. M.E.P. Win-Up LP, No. CV 
980164260, 1999 WL 989459, at *4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 1999); Fimon v. Kenroc Drywall 
Supplies, Inc., No. C7-02-1588, 2003 WL 1220240, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2003); Johnston 
v. Sw. Dining Servs., Inc., No. 05-95-01843-CV, 1999 WL 637217, at *4-6 (Tex. App. Aug. 23, 
1999); Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 75 P.3d 640, 651-56 (Wyo. 2003). Cases in which 
the courts did find potential iability in this context include Galaxy Networks, Inc. v. Kenan Sys- 
tems Corp., Nos. 97-56386, 97-56435, 2000 WL 714554 (9th Cir. June 2, 2000), in which the court 
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's breach of contract claims 
based on the defendant's representations during preliminary negotiations but denied the defen- 
dant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's quantum meruit claim. See id. at *3~5. 
32 See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. TVibune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987) ("It is fundamental to contract law that mere participation in negotiations and discussions 
does not create binding obligation, even if agreement is reached on all disputed terms. More is 
needed than agreement on each detail, which is overall agreement ... to enter into the binding 
contract."). 
33 See, e.g., Ocean Atl. Dev. Corp. v. Aurora Christian Sch., Inc., 322 F.3d 983, 997 (7th Cir. 
2003); Missigman v. USI Ne., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 495, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Gorodensky v. Mit- 
subishi Pulp Sales (MC) Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 249, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Universal Reinsurance 
Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 95 Civ. 8436 (WHP), 1999 WL 771357, at *5-6 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1999); Kreiss v. McCown De Leeuw & Co., 37 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300-01 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Commonwealth v. On-Point Tech. Sys., Inc., 821 A.2d 641, 648-49 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2003). 
It is noteworthy that, of these twenty-seven cases, only one awarded restitution to the plain- 
tiff. See Thayer v. Dial Indus. Sales, Inc. 189 F. Supp. 2d 81, 91-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The conven- 
tional view is that a promisee can recover in restitution for partial performance of an indefinite 
agreement. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §3.30, at 214 (4th ed. 2004) (citing 
Bragdon v. Shapiro, 77 A.2d 598 (Me. 195 1), in which the court permitted an employee to recover 
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whether preliminary agreements were sufficiently complete to be bind- 
ing contracts, even though they contemplated a further memorializa- 
tion, because the evidence showed that the formal writing may not 
have been essential. The courts treated these agreements as fully bind- 
ing contracts.34 Finally, and most interestingly, twelve cases turned on 
whether there was a preliminary agreement to negotiate further in 
good faith.35 
In sum, the sample shows that courts consistently have denied re- 
covery for precontractual reliance unless the parties, by agreeing on 
something significant, indicated their intention to be bound.36 The key 
issues thus involve reliance behavior that follows the conclusion of an 
agreement that is incomplete in some respects. Litigation results be- 
cause the agreement does not represent the final stage in the contract- 
ing process. Central to these cases, therefore, are the following ques- 
tions: First, what criteria do courts use to decide whether parties have 
made an enforceable preliminary agreement? Second, what does en- 
forcement entail? In the next section, we examine the evolving legal 
doctrines that affect hese questions. 
in quantum meruit for the value of extra efforts induced by his employer's promise to share the 
resulting profits). 
34 See, e.g., Fairbrook Leasing, Inc. v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 408 F.3d 460, 464-65 (8th Cir. 
2005); Tiburzi v. Dep't of Justice, 269 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Nielsen Media Research, 
Inc. v. Microsystems Software, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10876 (LAP), 2002 WL 31175223, at *6-7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002); Vacold LLC v. Cerami, No. 00 Civ. 4024 (AGS), 2002 WL 193157, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2002); Palm Desert Art, Inc. v. Mohr, No. 99-CV-1843, 2001 WL 66308, at *4 
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2001); Scholastic Inc. v. Harris, 80 F. Supp. 2d 139, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Situa- 
tion Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Malouf, Inc., 724 N.E.2d 699, 701-04 (Mass. 2000); Hunneman Real Es- 
tate Corp. v. Norwood Realty, Inc., 765 N.E.2d 800, 806 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); Erickson v. Hart, 
10 Mass. L. Rptr. 613, 614 (Super. Ct. 1999); Foss Mfg. Co. v. Maiden Mills Indus., Inc., 10 Mass. 
L. Rptr. 504, 508 (Super. Ct. 1999); Rudd v. Online Res., Inc., No. 17500, 1999 WL 397351, at *6 
(Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1999); Hughes v. Misar, 76 P.3d in, 115 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). 
35 See, e.g., Glenview Partners v. Plexus Corp., No. 00 C 3694, 2002 WL 1052040, at *3 (N.D. 
111. May 20, 2002); Liberty Envtl. Sys., Inc. v. County of Westchester, No. 94 Civ. 7431 (WK), 2000 
WL 1752927, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2000); Horphag Research Ltd. v. Henkel Corp., 115 F. 
Supp. 2d 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Matterhorn Group, Inc., No. 97-8273 (SMB), 2002 WL 
31528396, at *i2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002); Gillenardo v. Connor Broad. Del. Co., No. C.A. 
98C-06-015 WLW, 2002 WL 991 1 10, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2002); RGC Int'l Investors, 
LDC v. Greka Energy Corp., No. Civ. A. 17674, 2001 WL 984689, at *io-i3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 
2001); Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 694 N.E.2d 820, at *825-2 7 (Mass. 
1998). 
36 Courts traditionally consider a variety of factors as proxies for the intent of the parties re- 
garding when they have reached "agreement," including the extent to which agreement had been 
reached on all or most of the terms, whether this type of contract typically is reduced to a formal 
writing, the level of detail involved in the transaction, and the amount of money involved. See, 
e.g., Miss. & Dominion S.S. Co. v. Swift, 29 A. 1063, 1067 (Me. 1894); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
of Contracts § 27 cmt. c (1981). 
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B. The Enforcement ofPreliminary Agreements 
The initial issue in precontractual liability cases is whether the par- 
ties have manifested assent to an exchange.37 If the parties have not 
made a sufficiently clear and definite assent to an exchange, their ne- 
gotiations are treated as preliminary and reliance investments made in 
the course of negotiations are not recoverable.38 The courts have had 
difficulty, however, with preliminary agreements that settle some ma- 
jor terms but leave significant additional terms open for further nego- 
tiation. These "agreements to agree" invoke a core principle of the 
common law of contract: an enforceable contract requires promises 
that are sufficiently certain and definite that a court can ascertain the 
parties' intentions with a reasonable degree of certainty.39 This prin- 
ciple rests on the understanding that parties write contracts primarily 
to enable a party who feels herself unjustifiably disappointed to invoke 
the law's aid. It follows that parties do not intend to invoke the law - that is, they do not intend to be legally bound - when their agree- 
ment is so vague or lacks so many terms that a court cannot know 
what remedy to award.40 In contrast, a court can infer from terms 
that are sufficiently complete and definite to ground a remedy that the 
parties intended to make a legally enforceable contract.41 The focus 
37 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 17, 18. The manifestation of assent 
can be oral unless the statute of frauds requires a written assent, and it can be by conduct as well 
as by words. See id. § 10. 
38 The manifestation of assent must be sufficient o ground an objective belief by each party 
that the other has made a promise. Id. § 2 cmt. b. A promise, in turn, is determined by a party's 
objective manifestation rather than subjective intent. See Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank, 200 F. 
287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 191 1). By definition, therefore, a manifestation of uncertain or indefinite in- 
tent cannot qualify as a promise. See, e.g., Candid Prods., Inc. v. Int'l Skating Union, 530 F. 
Supp. 1330, 1333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33. 
39 See, e.g., Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. 
1981); Varney v. Ditmars, in N.E. 822 (N.Y. 1916). See generally 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WlL- 
LISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 4:18-29 (4th ed. 1990 & Supp. 2006) (surveying the law of indefinite 
promises). 
40 For example, in Petze v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 109 N.Y.S. 328 (App. Div. 1908), 
the New York court held that an agreement providing that "[t]he method of accounting to deter- 
mine the net distributable profits is to be agreed upon later," id. at 329 (quoting the agreement 
between the plaintiff and the defendant), was unenforceable under the indefiniteness rule. See id. 
at 331. Courts thereafter have held consistently that such "agreements to agree" are unenforce- 
able as long as any essential term is open to negotiation. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. 
Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 34-44, 322-25 (3d ed. 2002). 
41 Courts will infer an intent to be bound even though some terms in the agreement have been 
left open. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that, even if the parties failed to 
agree on certain terms, an agreement is a fully binding contract if the parties intended to be le- 
gally bound and there is a sufficiently definite basis to permit the court to grant an appropriate 
remedy in case of breach. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2005). The U.C.C. also follows the common law 
cases holding that price terms in sales contracts can be inferred from evidence of market prices. 
Thus, section 2-305 of the U.C.C. permits parties to conclude a sales contract even if they did not 
agree on a price, or if they agreed to agree on a price but subsequently could not do so. Under the 
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on the parties' intentions - permitting parties to determine just when 
their agreement becomes binding - enables parties to "negotiate can- 
didly, secure in the knowledge that [they] will not be bound until exe- 
cution of what both parties consider to be [a binding] document."42 
Recently, in a major shift in doctrine, courts have relaxed the knife- 
edge character of the common law by which parties are either fully 
bound or not bound at all. Instead, a new default rule is emerging to 
govern cases in which the parties contemplate further negotiations.43 
The default rule starts with the presumption that preliminary agree- 
ments typically do not create binding contracts.44 This presumption 
follows the common law approach and rests on the view that courts 
should not hold parties to contracts unless the parties intended to 
make them. The new default rule requires parties to such a prelimi- 
nary agreement to "accept a mutual commitment tonegotiate together 
in good faith in an effort o reach final agreement."45 Neither party, 
however, has a right o demand performance of the transaction. If the 
parties cannot ultimately agree on a final contract, hey may abandon 
the deal.46 
The doctrinal key to the enforcement ofthese agreements is the 
parties' intent. Courts honor express reservations of intention as well 
as statements of intention to be fully bound. The major doctrinal de- 
velopment is that modern courts recognize a further obligation to im- 
plement parties' expressed intent o bind themselves in preliminary 
agreements by creating a duty to bargain in good faith even when one 
of them prefers not to deal. 
This modern approach provides too little normative guidance. The 
cases endorse a multifactor analysis that invokes the language of the 
agreement; he existence, number, and character of open terms; the ex- 
tent of any reliance investments orpartial performance; and the cus- 
tomary practice regarding formalities.47 The court is to consider, in 
U.C.C., then, a court is asked to focus on the underlying question of intent and is encouraged to 
find an intention to contract despite the existence of open or indefinite terms. 
42 Winston v. Mediafare Entm't Corp., 777 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1985). 
43 This rule, developed by Judge Leval, has been followed extensively. See supra note 7. 
44 See R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 7<>i F.2d 60, 74 (2d Cir. 1084). 
45 Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. TVibune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987). When the parties have agreed upon everything important - when they have made what 
courts call a "fully binding preliminary agreement" - courts will enforce the disappointed pro- 
misee's expectation. See, e.g., Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 548 (2d 
Cir. 1998); Gorodensky v. Mitsubishi Pulp Sales (MC) Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). We focus here on so-called "binding preliminary commitments" in which the parties have 
left important matters for further negotiation. 
46 One court recently referred to this way of enforcing preliminary agreements as "the modern 
trend in contract law." Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 409 (4th 
Cir. 2002). 
47 See, e.g., Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 499-503; see also supra note 36. 
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addition, the context of the negotiations resulting in the preliminary 
agreement.48 Any list of relevant factors confines a court's discretion 
to some extent, but it leaves the decision process largely obscure when, 
as with these factors, courts fail to attach weights to the factors or to 
specify the relationship among them. For example, focusing on the 
number of terms that remain open is unhelpful: courts cannot easily 
determine whether many terms or only a few remain to be negotiated. 
Furthermore, the cases do not indicate what the parties are supposed 
to bargain over, or when the refusal to agree constitutes bad faith, 
or just what should be the remedy for bad faith. These normative 
questions cannot be resolved until the relevant positive questions are 
answered. 
III. A Model of Simultaneous 
and Sequential Investment 
A. The Model's Assumptions: Why Parties 
Write Preliminary Agreements*9 
Our model attempts to explain why parties make preliminary 
agreements and how such agreements can break down.50 To introduce 
the analysis, suppose that two parties come together to explore 
whether to produce a grinding machine that can be used to reduce 
various metallic ores and to produce a machine if it turns out to be 
profitable. Grinding machines can take a number of forms depending 
on cost and demand. One of these parties - the seller - invests in 
this project by researching the technical feasibility and cost of produc- 
ing various types of grinding machines. The other party - the buyer - invests by exploring demand for grinding machines and possible fi- 
nancing options. A "state of the world," or "ex post state," is defined 
by the realized values of three economic parameters: the level of de- 
mand for various grinding machine types, the cost of producing each 
of these types, and the options for financing. At the start, the parties 
know the distributions from which the values of the relevant parame- 
ters will be drawn. The parties learn the true values only after they 
invest. The parties then will continue their venture if the market urns 
48 See Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 500-01. This final factor recognizes that preliminary agree- 
ments always have open terms; hence, the existence of open terms does not preclude the obligation 
to negotiate further in good faith. See id. at 500-02. 
49 This section is written in narrative form, but it contains the assumptions on which the 
model is based. 
50 In this Part, we extend the model of Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, Holdup and Se- 
quential Specific Investments, 35 RAND J. ECON. 386 (2004), to the preliminary agreement con- 
text. This modeling strategy, in turn, is based on staged finance models used to explain venture 
capital investing. See id. at 386-87. 
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out to want a particular type of grinding machine that they can pro- 
duce and finance at an appropriate cost. Otherwise, the parties will 
abandon the project. 
To formalize this example, let two risk-neutral parties, a seller and 
a buyer, meet at time t0 to consider a project. The project will cer- 
tainly fail unless both parties invest in it, though it may still fail even 
if both invest. If the parties do not reach agreement and trade, the 
seller's investment is wasted - that is, her investment is fully relation- 
specific. The buyer's investment may be fully relation-specific, or it 
may benefit he seller even if the parties do not reach a deal. For ex- 
ample, the seller may benefit by learning more about the nature of 
demand for capital inputs in the mining industry even if the parties 
conclude that grinding machines will not sell. 
The parties cannot contract on their project at t0 because it is too 
complex. In particular, the project can take many forms, and there are 
a large number of possible states of the world. A project would be 
profitable to pursue, we assume, in only one of the possible ex post 
states. In that unique state, the level of demand, the financing, and 
production cost structure are such that the parties can profitably pro- 
duce one of the possible grinding machine types. When both the set of 
possible project types and the set of possible ex post states are large, 
and the parties do not know at the outset which of the possible project 
types, if any, will be profitable, it is not feasible for them to write an ex 
ante contract on the project. Nevertheless, the parties can agree at t0 
on the nature of the project (to produce a grinding machine); on what 
each party, broadly speaking, is to do (be responsible for product de- 
sign and costs and attempt o line up final users and financing); and on 
timing decisions (whether to explore technical feasibility first or to ex- 
plore technical feasibility and market opportunities at the same time). 
A project becomes tangible - it will support a complete contract - 
after these initial investments. 
There are two investment regimes. In the first, the parties agree to 
invest simultaneously. In the second, the parties agree that one party 
will invest first and the other will wait a period and then invest. Each 
party knows the distribution of costs from which the other's invest- 
ment will be drawn and can observe the results of the investment, but 
the precise timing and level of actual investment is private informa- 
tion. For example, if the seller invests in creating a set of plans, the 
buyer ultimately can observe whether the seller created the plans. 
However, the buyer cannot know when the seller began to work or the 
level of the seller's investment that creating the plans turned out to re- 
quire. These assumptions are motivated by realism: when parties are 
in different industries or trades, it is difficult for each of them to ob- 
serve the other's cost function. Each party believes, however, that if a 
dispute were to arise, she could verify to a court a fraction of the costs 
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of her own completed investment. For the reasons just given, this 
fraction also is private information a d so is not contractible. 
In both investment regimes, the parties learn which of the possible 
project types, if any, would be profitable to produce after time has 
passed and at least one party has invested. In the grinding machine 
example, the seller's research may reveal that no new grinding ma- 
chine is technically feasible, or the buyer's research may reveal that 
only one machine type could sell in the actual ex post state. Invest- 
ment and the resolution of uncertainty hus play two roles: they reveal 
whether a project would be profitable, and they make profitable pro- 
jects sufficiently angible to be realized in final contracts. 
The parties cannot write a final contract before the ex post state of 
the world is revealed. Although ex ante contracting has been shown to 
induce efficient investment in some contexts in which there is asym- 
metric information, ex ante contracting cannot encourage fficient in- 
vestment in the contexts we describe. Even when parties cannot con- 
tract directly on investment behavior, the ex ante contract could 
induce efficient investment ifit could appropriately allocate the ex- 
pected surplus that the contemplated transaction would yield. For ex- 
ample, if one party must incur the larger share of the investment cost 
to bring a project o fruition, the contract could award this party the 
larger share of the expected surplus. The preliminary agreements we 
study cannot affect investment behavior in this way, however. We as- 
sume, consistent with the common view that it is difficult to contract 
directly on expected profits or costs,51 that parties can observe but 
cannot verify to a court the expected surplus from the complex pro- 
jects that we model.52 When a court cannot observe a project's sur- 
plus, it cannot enforce a contract hat attempts to allocate that surplus 
in such a fashion that will induce each party to choose the efficient in- 
vestment level. 
51 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete 
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 284 (1992). 
52 An economic variable is un verifiable if the costs to the parties of establishing the value of 
the variable in a legal proceeding exceed the expected gains. Although parties commonly can es- 
timate the expected value of conducting a transaction, the costs required to prove the profit that a 
forgone transaction would have yielded often exceed the share of that profit that a successful iti- 
gant would realize. Verifiability is not coextensive with, but is related to, the legal concepts of 
foreseeability and certainty. Thus, we assume that the parties can observe the expected surplus 
from completing their project, so that surplus is foreseeable to them, but we also assume that the 
cost of establishing the surplus in court would exceed the gain. Legal costs may be high because, 
among other reasons, a party has to introduce a great deal of evidence to show that her contract 
partner should have known the gain expected from a completed deal. For a discussion of how 
front-end investments by parties in stipulating evidentiary proxies, allocating burdens of proof, 
and allocating standards of proof can lower these back-end enforcement costs, see Robert E. Scott 
& George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE LJ. 814 (2006). 
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The inability to contract on surplus directly would not be fatal, 
however, if the parties either could commit not to renegotiate heir ex 
ante contract or could specify in that contract he project ype the par- 
ties hoped later to produce and trade.53 Regarding the possibility of 
renegotiation, suppose that only the seller is to invest. The ex ante 
contract could authorize the seller to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to 
the buyer after the investment s age is over. The seller will then make 
an offer awarding to her the full surplus that trade will generate. An- 
ticipating this payoff, the seller will invest efficiently; that is, she will 
invest to increase expected surplus until the marginal gain from fur- 
ther investment equals the marginal cost. Contracts that allocate bar- 
gaining power to a seller in this way cannot work, however, if the 
buyer can refuse the seller's take-it-or-leave-it offer and propose a new 
division of the surplus. Then, the seller's choice will be to bargain 
over the division - to renegotiate he ex ante contract - or to forgo 
gains. Because parties are reluctant to leave money on the table, the 
seller would renegotiate, and she seldom could bargain to capture the 
entire gain. But any seller who anticipated not being able to appropri- 
ate the full value from her investment ina project would underinvest; 
that is, she would invest only until the marginal cost equaled her frac- 
tion of the expected gain. Because parties cannot commit not to rene- 
gotiate under current law, the proposed contract, or variants of it 
for cases in which both parties must invest, cannot induce efficient 
investment.54 
Specifying the project type through specific performance ontracts 
would also be ineffective in the contexts we consider. Parties can 
sometimes write specific performance ontracts that induce efficient 
investment even when renegotiation cannot be prevented. For exam- 
ple, if the parties know in advance that they will either trade a par- 
ticular grinding machine or not trade, their ex ante contract can re- 
quire the seller to deliver that machine at a fixed price if the state of 
the world turns out to be favorable. If a court would enforce this con- 
tract specifically, and if the price were appropriately chosen, the con- 
tract could induce efficient investment. However, even if the parties 
could verify to a court that the favorable state of the world had mate- 
rialized, in our model the parties could not specify in advance just 
53 For a discussion of how renegotiation and describability affect contracting behavior, see 
BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 10, at 560-78. The principal paper showing how parties' 
inability to describe in the ex ante contract what is to be traded eliminates the value of ex ante 
contracting is Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. 
Stud. 115, 120(1999). 
54 For further analysis of the law governing parties' rights to renegotiate and modify contracts, 
see Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modifica- 
tion, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (1997), and Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and 
the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 611-14 (2003). 
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what project type they would later want to trade because there are too 
many possible product types that may work and too many possible 
states of the world that may exist. A court cannot specifically enforce 
a contract without a subject matter. As a consequence, it would be 
pointless for the parties to set a price. And without a price, the ex ante 
contract could not allocate the transaction's expected surplus to induce 
efficient investment. In our model, then, there is no gain from ex ante 
contracting, so such contracting will not occur. The model thus cap- 
tures the decided cases: the parties in these cases either failed to agree 
on anything or had made only preliminary agreements that did not at- 
tempt to allocate surplus, set prices, or specify the parties' bargaining 
power in an ex post renegotiation. 
B. The Model's Technical Details 
The nature of the project requires that one of the parties, who we 
assume is the buyer, moves first.55 If the parties make a preliminary 
agreement at toJ the buyer will invest the discrete sum xb at time tx. In 
the simultaneous investment regime, the seller invests the discrete sum 
xs at tl as well; in the sequential regime, the seller invests at time t2. 
After a party completes its investment, the other party can observe 
ax{, where i e {&, s}, where 0 < a < 1, and where the investing party 
can later verify ax{ to a court. Each investment x is composed of 
various elements: raw materials, salaries, and the value of human capi- 
tal. The cost of some of these elements, such as the raw materials a 
party ordered, likely will become verifiable later, whereas the cost of 
other elements, such as time spent thinking, will not. The sum of the 
verifiable lements divided by the total investment x equals the verifi- 
able fraction a. At t0, each party knows its own expected a but does 
not know its partner's expected a.56 
The party's investments are assumed to be perfect complements in 
the sense that the project will fail unless both investments are made. 
If the parties both invest, however, the project nevertheless ucceeds 
only with probability p < 1 - when the state of the world turns out to 
55 If the technology of the project requires both parties to invest simultaneously, the problem is 
not normatively interesting. The most reasonable equilibrium has both investing when invest- 
ment would be efficient. In these circumstances, the parties will pursue an efficient project and 
will abandon an unsuccessful project, and there is no role for law to play. If the technology of the 
project instead permits either to invest first, the parties play a dynamic game in mixed strategies 
to determine who moves initially, but the qualitative results reached below will not change. 
56 If or were verifiable, the parties could induce optimal investment by requiring the party who 
failed to invest appropriately to pay 1 / a{ of the other party's reliance costs. On our assumptions, 
this contract cannot be written. The parties also cannot write a contract requiring each of them 
to invest up to the level x because, plausibly in our view, a party cannot know just what level of 
investment her partner must reach in order for him to perform his assigned task, and that party 
also would have difficulty observing whether her partner had invested up to x. 
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be favorable - and fails with probability 1 - p. A successful project 
returns a surplus 5 > 0 that is net of production cost but gross of in- 
vestment cost. The expected surplus in any other state of the world is 
5 < 0, so no project is pursued in these states. 
If both parties invest at tl and the project turns out to be profitable, 
they will write a final contract and begin to pursue the project at t2. If 
one party invests at tl and the other invests at t2, the parties will begin 
to pursue the project one period later, at time t3. The parties discount 
returns at S< 1, and investment is assumed to be ex ante efficient; that 
is, the expected value of the project at tQ in the sequential investment 
regime, pS2S, exceeds the sum of the parties' investment costs.57 We 
note finally that in the sequential investment regime, in which the 
seller is permitted to invest after the buyer invests, the seller will exit 
the project unless it turns out to be a success. Figures 1 and 2 describe 
the timelines for these regimes. 
Figure i. Simultaneous Regime 
Figure 2. Sequential Regime 
57 Regarding the expected project value, the project succeeds with probability p, and when it 
succeeds it returns S. In the simultaneous investment regime, the parties receive S two periods 
after they invest, so S must be discounted one period; in the sequential regime, the parties receive 
5 after three periods, so they discount S by two periods. Hence, the expected project value in the 
sequential regime is pS2S. Our assumption that this value exceeds total investment costs implies 
that the simultaneous investment regime is also socially efficient because returns are realized one 
period earlier in this regime. We assume that the project is efficient because we want to see when 
parties will pursue such projects. 
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If the project turns out to be profitable to pursue, the parties will 
write a complete contracts Because their ex ante agreement did not 
describe or price the particular project they will trade, the parties must 
bargain as if from scratch to divide a profitable project's expected 
gains. We assume Nash bargaining and normalize each party's next- 
best option to zero. This assumption implies that the price in the par- 
ties' complete contract will equally divide the surplus that trade is ex- 
pected to create.58 
The comparative welfare effects of these investment regimes are 
ambiguous a priori. On the one hand, the simultaneous regime is bet- 
ter, all else equal, because it accelerates the realization of returns: the 
parties capture profits earlier. On the other hand, if no successful pro- 
ject is revealed, both parties' investments would be wasted in the si- 
multaneous regime, whereas only the buyer's investment would be 
wasted in the sequential regime. 
C. The Parties' Behavior 
We begin with the simultaneous investment regime and introduce 
the holdup problem that exists when parties must invest before they 
make a fully binding contract.59 The project succeeds with probability 
/>, each party will then receive one half the project's surplus less its in- 
vestment cost, and the gross return must be discounted one period. 
That is, buyer's and seller's expected returns from investment in this 
regime are, respectively: 
P3S - - xb (1) 
58 According to Nash bargaining, a party's bargaining power in a negotiation is a function of 
the parties' disagreement points and their relative patience, as measured by their discount rates. 
The party who has the better outside option - the better disagreement point - has more power 
in the negotiation because he must receive a larger share to compensate him for making the deal. 
Similarly, the more patient party has more power because he can wait longer for a good offer. 
Our assumption that both parties' next-best options are zero implies that they have the same dis- 
agreement points. It also is customary to assume that commercial parties are equally patient - 
they have the same discount rates - because commercial parties usually can borrow or lend in 
the same competitive capital market. On these assumptions, the parties have equal bargaining 
power so neither can credibly demand more than an equal split. If one party does demand a more 
favorable split, the other will refuse, knowing that the demanding party will accept half the ex- 
pected gain rather than receive no gain at all. The qualitative results that we reach will not 
change if the bargaining power assumption is relaxed. For example, if the seller is assumed to 
have more bargaining power than the buyer, she will invest a larger sum - because she will real- 
ize more than half the surplus - and the buyer will invest less, but the parties still will have in- 
centives to behave strategically that are normatively interesting to analyze. 
59 The analysis in this section assumes that the law does not award a remedy unless the parties 
have made a complete contract because the issue is whether a legal remedy would be useful in the 
context under study. 
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Because the parties' costs may not be equal, the sum of Expres- 
sions (1) and (2) can be positive - that is, the project can have positive 
expected value - even if one of the private expected returns is nega- 
tive. The project requires the participation of both parties, however, 
so if one party's expected return is negative, the project will not be 
undertaken. This is the ex ante holdup problem: a party will not in- 
vest at all when he must share the expected gain with his partner, and 
as a consequence the party's portion of the return will be below his 
cost. The problem would vanish if the parties could contract on in- 
vestment at t0. When a project will generate total expected gains in 
excess of costs, the party whose expected return is positive can guaran- 
tee his partner a nonnegative return by agreeing to reimburse his part- 
ner for investment costs if the project is not pursued. Investments are 
not contractible in this model, however.60 
In the sequential regime illustrated in Figure 2, the buyer invests 
initially and then, if the project will be a success, the parties renegoti- 
ate. Going forward from t2, the net gain from the seller's investment is 
the expected project surplus less the seller's cost. The buyer's costs are 
then sunk and so will be ignored when the parties renegotiate. In the 
success state, the buyer expects to receive half the surplus less his in- 
vestment cost; the seller expects to receive half the surplus. Because 
returns in this regime are realized at £3, they must be discounted two 
periods. Hence, in this regime the parties expect that renegotiation to 




60 Our ex ante holdup result is identical to the result recently presented by Luca Anderlini and 
Leonardo Felli, see Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the 
Coase Theorem, 116 ECON. J. 223, 229 (2006) (labeling this result "Proposition 1"), except that the 
costs in their model are transaction costs, whereas the costs in our model are investment costs. In 
both models, the parties' inability to contract in advance on costs can preclude the formation of 
some efficient agreements. 
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To compare the relative efficiency of these regimes, denote social 
welfare from the simultaneous and the sequential investment regimes 
Wsim and W^ respectively.61 In formal terms, the simultaneous regime 
is better if 5(1 - S) > xs(l I pS- 1). This inequality shows that a social 
planner would prefer simultaneous investment when: (i) the project is 
likely to succeed, so the seller's investment is unlikely to be wasted (p 
is high); (2) the parties' discount rate is high, so that delaying returns 
by a period will be costly (Sis low); (3) the seller's costs probably will 
turn out to be low, so that little will be saved by letting the seller await 
events (xs is expected to be small); and (4) the surplus will be large (5 is 
expected to be large). 
The parties' preferences sometimes will not correspond to society's 
preference, however. The buyer always prefers simultaneous invest- 
ment because he does not have to reimburse the seller's cost in this re- 
gime. Specifically, the buyer prefers simultaneous investment when 
Expression (1) exceeds Expression (3): 
if.^P^A^ (5) 
This inequality reduces to S > xs/ (S- 1). The right-hand side of this 
inequality is always negative because S < 1. 5 is positive because the 
parties only pursue positive-expected- value projects, so the inequality 
is always satisfied. 
In contrast to the buyer's preferences, the seller's preferences are 
parameter-specific. She prefers simultaneous investment when it 
would generate a greater private return - that is, when Expression (2) 
exceeds Expression (4): 
2 s 2 
Assuming that the buyer will participate, sequential investment is effi- 
cient when the left-hand side of this inequality is negative and the 
right-hand side is positive - that is, when the seller will reject the si- 
multaneous regime but can realize a positive return in the sequential 
regime. The seller can earn a positive return in the sequential regime 
because she is not subject to holdup in this regime; she will invest only 
if the ex post bargain compensates her.62 The availability of the se- 
61 The social welfare in a regime is the expected value of success to both parties 
discounted to present value, less the sum of the parties' costs. Therefore, Wsim = pSS -xs- xb, and 
WSf=pS2S-p&cs-xb. 
62 In the renegotiation, the parties will agree to a contract price of k = xs + {d S - ox) / 2, so the 
seller recovers her costs while the buyer does not. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.75 on Thu, 28 Jan 2016 19:34:26 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2OO7] PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS 685 
quential regime thus permits some projects to be done that would oth- 
erwise be forgone. 
The availability of the sequential regime nevertheless creates an 
opportunity for the seller to behave strategically. To see why a seller 
might choose to defect, suppose that simultaneous investment is more 
efficient han sequential investment and the parties agree to function 
in the simultaneous regime. Solving Inequality (6) for the surplus 5 
yields Inequality (7), which more clearly indicates how the surplus 5 
depends on the variables that affect the seller's incentive to comply 
with an agreement to invest simultaneously: 
S>PS(l-S)- 
(7) 
The seller will comply when the left-hand side of Inequality (7) - 
the project's surplus - is larger than the right-hand side. The right- 
hand side of (6), in turn, is increasing in xs and 8 and is decreasing in 
p. Inequality (7), therefore, shows that the seller is more iikely to de- 
fect to sequential investment if her costs are high because she would 
save a more substantial sum if there is no profitable project to pursue. 
Inequality (7) also shows that the seller is more likely to defect when 
she is more patient. The seller trades off the value of the option to de- 
lay and see how things turn out against the cost of delaying a possibly 
positive return. The more patient the seller is, the more likely she is to 
make that tradeoff in favor of delay. Finally, the inequality shows that 
the seller is more likely to comply with her agreement if there is a high 
probability that she will recover her investment costs. The probability 
of cost recovery gets larger as the parties' project becomes more likely 
to succeed.63 To be sure, the seller's incentive to breach an agreement 
to invest simultaneously can be overcome if a successful project will 
generate a large enough gain - that is, if S is large. Nevertheless, 
breach is always a possibility, and it is inefficient when Wsim > W . 
D. The Ex Post Holdup Problem and Our Solution 
The seller's incentive to breach may prevent some efficient projects 
from being pursued. The buyer's expected return from sequential in- 
vestment can be negative when his return from simultaneous invest- 
ment is positive. In such cases, the buyer will participate only if the 
seller agrees to simultaneous investment. Even if the seller agrees, 
63 Formally, the discount factor S becomes larger - future returns become worth more - as 
the party becomes more patient. Hence, that the right-hand side of Inequality (7) is increasing in 
8 means that patient sellers are more likely to defect from agreements to invest simultaneously. 
That the right-hand side of Inequality (7) is decreasing in p means that sellers are more likely to 
defect when projects are only marginally likely to be successful - that is, when p is low. 
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however, a sophisticated buyer will still not participate if his costs will 
be high and the seller's defection is a serious possibility.64 The seller 
prefers to commit to simultaneous investment in this circumstance 
whenever her expected gain is positive, but she cannot. As section C 
shows, sellers sometimes have an incentive to wait, and the parties 
cannot contract on the timing or level of investment. Hence, the 
seller's promise to begin by a certain date and then to invest up to the 
optimal level will not be credible. As a consequence, efficient projects 
will sometimes be forgone. This is the ex post holdup problem.65 
To examine whether the law can help, denote the buyer's expected 
return in the simultaneous regime g = pSS I 2 - xb. Denote the buyer's 
expected return in the sequential regime h = p(S2S - &c) I 2 - xb. As 
section C shows, h < g. In the case we consider in this section, h is 
negative and g is positive. Also, let the subjective probability that the 
buyer assigns to seller defection from the simultaneous regime be q. 
Finally, recall that though parties cannot contract on investment or on 
the fraction of investment a that later becomes verifiable, a portion of 
the buyer's investment cost abxb is verifiable ex post. If the law per- 
mitted the buyer to recover the verifiable portion of his reliance, then 
at t0 the buyer's expected return from an agreement to invest simulta- 
neously would be q(h + abxb) + (1 - q)g. 
The first term, q(h + ocbxb), is the buyer's expected return if the 
seller does defect: it equals the loss from being forced into the sequen- 
tial regime h, offset by the reliance recovery abxbJ and multiplied by the 
probability of seller defection q. The second term, (1 - q)g, is the 
buyer's expected return if the seller complies with her agreement: the 
probability of compliance 1 - q times the expected gain g. 
When the buyer's expected return in the simultaneous investment 
regime is negative without the reliance offset and positive with it, a 
buyer who expects to recover reliance will make a preliminary agree- 
ment that he otherwise would have rejected. Hence, awarding verifi- 
able reliance to promisees when promisors exploit them will increase 
the number of efficient preliminary agreements. Such awards also 
may deter parties from breaching these agreements. If a seller expects 
64 The buyer cannot predict with certainty whether the seller will defect because he does not 
know xs. The buyer knows p and S, however. When p is relatively low and Sis relatively high, 
the prospect of seller breach can be sufficiently great to deter the buyer from participating. 
65 The model here has at most two investment stages: either both parties invest at the same 
time or one invests and then the other does. The model generalizes to multistage projects in 
which it is efficient either for both parties to invest at the penultimate stage or for one to invest at 
this stage and the other to wait until the last stage. If both parties should invest at the penulti- 
mate stage but one of them expects the other to defect and wait, the former party may not invest 
at the penultimate stage. The other party will anticipate this and will not invest at the next- 
earliest stage, so the project will unravel. At some stage, there is a need for commitment. 
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that a nontrivial fraction of her buyer's reliance will become verifiable, 
her incentive to comply increases materially. 
We make five elaborating comments about our recommendation 
that the law should protect the buyer's reliance interest in this 
category of cases.66 First, expectation damages cannot be awarded in 
these cases. The buyer's expectation in the simultaneous regime is 
8S I 2 - xb. The law cannot award this amount because neither the ex- 
pected surplus S nor the full amount of the buyer's investment xh is 
verifiable under our assumptions.67 The legal requirement that dam- 
ages must be reasonably certain and foreseeable precludes expectation 
recoveries in the cases we consider. 
Second, the buyer should be afforded a remedy regardless of 
whether the project turns out to be efficient o pursue. When the pro- 
ject is efficient o pursue and the buyer agrees to the exploitative rene- 
gotiation price,68 delay by the seller should be treated as an instance of 
duress, and the buyer should be permitted later to sue for reliance. If 
the seller delays investing and the buyer's investment shows that the 
project would be inefficient, he seller will exit. Although the project 
should not be pursued, the seller still should be liable for the buyer's 
reliance.69 Awarding reliance in both cases will encourage buyers to 
make efficient preliminary agreements and will sometimes deter stra- 
tegic behavior by sellers. Nevertheless, although protecting the buyer's 
reliance interest will increase efficiency, it will not achieve the first- 
best outcome. In some cases, the verifiable portion of the buyer's reli- 
ance will be too small to sustain his incentive to make a preliminary 
agreement. Moreover, recall that we have normalized each party's 
next-best option to zero for modeling convenience. If the buyer's op- 
tion is positive, the base return of verifiable reliance in the deal may 
be too low to motivate efficient investment. First-best outcomes are 
66 The buyer's investment may benefit the seller by permitting her to use the investment in 
other situations. For example, the buyer may show the seller how to package her product to 
make it desirable to many buyers. If the benefit is verifiable, an alternative remedy to reliance is 
quantum meruit: the buyer should recover the benefit he conferred on the seller. If this recovery 
creates a large enough offset o h, the buyer's loss from holdup, the buyer again is encouraged to 
invest. 
67 Courts sometimes can use evidentiary proxies for costs that would otherwise be private 
information. When these proxies are helpful, the fraction of reliance that is verifiable a will 
increase. 
68 See supra note 62. 
69 The law should not require an inefficient performance, but it should discourage strategic 
behavior and encourage efficient investment. Thus, although the seller's delay saved costs in this 
instance, delay should be treated as a breach. Permitting buyers to recover reliance in failed deals 
will not discourage sellers from participating. A fraction of the seller's reliance costs will become 
verifiable if she invests. Therefore, a seller can establish, by her investment behavior, that she 
complied with her agreement to invest simultaneously. Only sellers that plan to behave in bad 
faith will be deterred. 
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difficult toachieve in asymmetric information e vironments, however. 
The rule we recommend would be a Pareto improvement. 
Third, prior analyses how that protecting the reliance interest in- 
duces contracting parties to overinvest.70 Overinvestment is not a 
concern in this analysis because the model assumes investment is dis- 
crete: the buyer invests xb or he does not. Since the model assumes 
that investment by the buyer would be ex ante efficient, he subsidy 
we advocate is also efficient. However, in reality, overinvestment con- 
ceivably can be a danger when, as sometimes happens, the parties' 
payoffs are a continuous function of the amount hey invest. In these 
cases, because the remedy we advocate subsidizes the buyer's reliance 
in the breach state, the buyer can be induced to invest oo much. 
The danger of overinvestment is not serious, however.71 In the se- 
quential regime, the marginal dollar of the buyer's expected return is 
subject to a large "holdup tax": he realizes less than half of that dollar 
because he must split gains with the seller and bear the seller's in- 
vestment cost, as Expression (3) shows. The law would subsidize the 
marginal value of the buyer's investment ifit permitted the buyer to 
recover verifiable reliance. Even when the buyer believes that the 
seller will breach with certainty and thus force him into the sequential 
regime, he has an incentive to overrely at the margin only if the value 
of the "breach subsidy" exceeds the cost of the holdup tax. Since the 
tax is larger than fifty percent, the subsidy has to be substantial; that 
is, a large fraction of the buyer's investment needs to be verifiable.72 
In the simultaneous regime, the buyer also pays a holdup tax on the 
marginal dollar of his expected return, but he receives no breach sub- 
sidy. Thus, a buyer will underrely if he believes that the seller will cer- 
tainly comply with her agreement to invest simultaneously. When the 
buyer makes his investment decision, he will compare the net marginal 
return in the sequential regime, weighted by the probability of seller 
breach, against the net marginal return in the simultaneous regime, 
weighted by the probability of seller performance. Since the breach 
subsidy may not by itself ully offset he tax in the sequential regime 
and sellers are more likely to perform than not, the expected value of 
70 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 
472 (1980) (noting that "in deciding on his level of reliance, [the victim of breach] does not prop- 
erly recognize that reliance is in fact like an investment which does not pay off in the event of 
breach"); see also William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of 
Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39, 47 (1984) (concluding that under expectation damages, buyers 
will choose a greater-than-efficient l vel of reliance). 
71 We establish this point formally in the Appendix but describe the underlying intuition here. 
72 In such cases, the parties may contract directly on costs. Thus, for example, parties write 
cost-plus contracts when costs are substantially verifiable. See Patrick Bajari & Steven Tadelis, 
Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts, 32 RAND J. ECON. 387, 
396 (2001). 
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the marginal dollar of the buyer's return will ordinarily be less than a 
dollar. In sum, the buyer will almost always invest too little even 
when the law subsidizes him. 
Fourth, if protecting reliance enhances efficiency, there is a question 
why parties do not contract directly on reliance expenditures. Reliance 
contracts are not common for two reasons. First, reliance is often un- 
verifiable. Second, there is a moral hazard concern. The buyer, for 
example, is motivated to incur excessive exploration costs if he can 
partly externalize those costs to the seller. The moral hazard concern 
deters parties from contracting directly on reliance even when reliance 
is verifiable. The excessive exploration concern also exists in connec- 
tion with mergers. Courts permit a disappointed acquirer to recover 
investigation and related costs when parties agree to a deal but the 
target later finds another buyer. Parties do not contract directly on 
these costs, but instead use breakup fees. A breakup fee ameliorates 
the moral hazard concern because the would-be acquirer's payoff 
when a deal breaks up is independent of the amount the acquirer in- 
vested in evaluating the acquisition. Courts treat breakup fees as liq- 
uidated damage clauses and enforce a breakup fee if it reflects a rea- 
sonable estimate of the buyer's costs.73 Thus, the better question here 
is why parties do not liquidate reliance damages in the preliminary 
agreement. 
Our answer is that courts will probably treat such clauses as penal- 
ties. Under the penalty rule, courts will enforce liquidated damage 
clauses only if the promisee has a right to the damages at issue.74 
Thus, courts will permit a promisee to liquidate an estimate of his ex- 
pectation because there is a prior right to recover the expectation, and 
courts will permit a disappointed acquirer to liquidate transaction 
costs because there is a prior right to recover them. In the preliminary 
agreement context, many courts will not protect the promisee's reli- 
ance at all; other courts will protect reliance only if the promisor failed 
to bargain in good faith when a deal did not materialize. Thus, there 
is currently no clear rule permitting the unjustifiably disappointed 
party to a preliminary agreement to recover his investment costs when 
the promisor breaches. Because this is the law, a clause liquidating re- 
liance costs in the preliminary agreement would probably be struck 
down as a penalty. Our analysis predicts, then, that if the right to re- 
cover investment costs becomes clearly established, parties will prefer 
liquidating an estimate of these costs to suing directly for them. 
Fifth, the prospect of a reliance recovery before the parties make a 
final contract conceivably can chill negotiations and thus prevent the 
73 See, e.g., Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997). 
74 See U.C.C. § 2-718 (2005); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 (1981). 
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pursuit of efficient deals. This effect should not be a serious danger as 
long as courts refuse to find a binding preliminary commitment unless 
all three aspects of a preliminary agreement - an intention to pursue 
a profitable project, a division of investment asks, and an agreement 
on an investment sequence - exist. We make two comments with re- 
spect to the possibility that a danger might be thought to remain. Ini- 
tially, the seller is the party whose participation may be chilled, but it 
is also the seller who wants the ability to commit to the preliminary 
agreement, for when the buyer refuses to deal, the seller must forgo a 
positive expected return. Awarding reliance to the buyer is the only 
effective way to permit the seller to commit to perform the preliminary 
agreement. A seller who does not want to commit can contract out 
because the rule we advocate is a default. Courts should, and do, en- 
force the analog of merger clauses that recite such intentions as: "No 
liability whatsoever is to attach to any representations made during 
negotiations and before a final written agreement is signed."75 
To summarize, the seller breaches in this model by promising to in- 
vest simultaneously but then, without investing, waiting until after the 
buyer has invested, and after the project has become tangible, either to 
exit or to renegotiate to complete the project. This breach creates two 
inefficiencies. First, if the buyer makes and complies with the pre- 
liminary agreement, and if the project is profitable, breach causes pro- 
ject returns to be unduly delayed. Second, if the buyer would other- 
wise not invest in the sequential regime, the possibility that the seller 
will force the buyer into this regime by delaying will sometimes cause 
sophisticated buyers not to make ex ante efficient preliminary agree- 
ments. Thus, awarding buyers reliance when sellers breach will in- 
crease the probability that parties will make these agreements. This 
conclusion can be restated in an illuminating way. The law encour- 
ages parties to invest and trade efficiently by enforcing the contracts 
they make. This Article shows that the law can also help by encourag- 
ing parties to make those exploratory investments that are a necessary 
precondition to the later writing of efficient final contracts. 
TXirning more directly to the law, we see that the question whether 
there was a preliminary agreement or no agreement should not turn on 
whether the contract has a price or indicates agreement on a "suffi- 
cient" number of terms. Rather, a preliminary agreement - an inten- 
tion to make a binding preliminary commitment - should be found 
when the parties have agreed, albeit imprecisely, on the nature of the 
project; on the categories of action, such as marketing or construction, 
into which their investments are to fall; and on the order in which they 
are to act. There is breach of a binding preliminary commitment 
75 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 29. 
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when the parties agree to proceed at roughly the same time and one of 
them materially delays. If the buyer can recover verifiable reliance, 
then, as we argue, parties will make more preliminary agreements. 
The courts, however, add the doctrinal requirement that breach trig- 
gers a duty to bargain in good faith. This duty is unnecessary, but if 
courts retain the obligation, the "mandatory subjects of bargaining" 
should be restricted to whether there actually was a breach - whether 
the promisor delayed investment - and the magnitude of the pro- 
misee's reliance. It is unnecessary to require the parties to bargain 
over whether to pursue the project itself because parties already have 
sufficient motivation to pursue efficient projects. 
IV. Applying the Model to the Case Law 
In this Part, we examine the contemporary case law in light of two 
questions. First, do the cases reveal a behavioral pattern consistent 
with the model's description of how parties act in early reliance con- 
texts? Second, do courts award damages in the circumstances in 
which our analysis suggests they should? The cases are the obvious 
vehicle for answering the second question, but as a rule, cases are a 
poor vehicle for answering questions about commercial behavior. Con- 
tract databases permit the predictions of theoretical models to be 
tested much more rigorously than cases do because it is often difficult 
to infer commercial behavior from the factual descriptions in court 
opinions. Regrettably, however, the contract databases are not appro- 
priate for this Article because we study preliminary agreements, which 
are sometimes unwritten and, moreover, are not collected. As a posi- 
tive matter, then, we show in the analysis that follows that the cases 
reveal behavior that is consistent with our model. We also show that 
courts sometimes, though not always, decide cases as we think they 
should. 
A, The Databases and General Results 
To test the model's predictive power, we assembled a case sample 
that focused precisely on the analytical framework established by 
Judge Leval in Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass9n of America v. 
Tribune Co.76 A combination of a Westlaw KeyCite search and a 
Westlaw terms and connectors search produced a set of cases from 
which we culled a random sample of 142 cases dating from 1989 to 
200s.77 Forty of the cases turned on issues that were not relevant to 
76 670 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
77 We selected every other case on the KeyCite list of citing references, leaving us with 120 
cases. We then ran a terms and connectors earch for an additional 30 cases. This search pro- 
vided a second set of cases against which to compare the results of the first 120 to check for bias 
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the enforcement of preliminary agreements. The remaining 102 cases 
involved a claim for recovery of early reliance investments. In thirty- 
eight cases, the court denied recovery on all grounds, including argu- 
ments based on Judge Leval's preliminary agreement taxonomy and 
on alternative theories of promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, breach 
of fiduciary duty, and misrepresentation. The court found, in the ma- 
jority of these cases, that the parties were still engaged in negotiations, 
so that the facts could not sustain an inference that the parties in- 
tended to be legally bound.78 
The remaining sixty-four cases fell into two categories. In thirty- 
three of these cases, the court held that a jury either could or correctly 
did find the agreement to be fully binding by its terms so that a court 
could protect the expectation interest.79 In the other thirty-one, the 
court held that the parties had either made a preliminary agreement or 
alleged sufficient facts to sustain a jury verdict finding a duty to bar- 
gain in good faith.80 
introduced by the search method. The word search was (DA(AFT 05/25/2002) & ("letter of intent" 
"preliminary agreement" working agreement" protocol of intent" "letter of agreement" "memo- 
randum of understanding" "agreement in principle" "loi" "mou") /p ("good faith" "fair dealing") & 
breach). This search yielded 123 cases, and we selected every fourth case. Of those 30, eight were 
redundant with the KeyCite search, and so our queries returned a total of 142 different cases. 
78 Twenty cases denied recovery because the reliance occurred during negotiations. See, e.g., 
Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., No. 00 Civ. 7872 (SAS), 2001 WL 1524479, at *25-26 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2001); Horphag Research Ltd. v. Henkel Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Sevel Arg., S.A. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F. Supp. 2d 261, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); 
In re Kaplan Breslaw Ash, LLC, 264 B.R. 309, 323-24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001). In thirteen cases, 
the court found that the parties either had made a comfort agreement that was too indefinite to 
enforce legally or had expressly declared that the agreement was not binding. See, e.g., Tecart 
Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 719, 726 (D. Md. 2002); Paramount Brokers, 
Inc. v. Digital River, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 939, 947 (D. Md. 2000); Lieberman v. Good Stuff Corp., 
No. 94 Civ. 5601, 1995 WL 600864, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1995). In seven cases, the court 
found that the parties had contracted for express conditions precedent to enforcement of the 
agreement. When the conditions precedent failed to materialize, the duty of the defendant o per- 
form was discharged. See, e.g., Alta. Ltd. v. Dataphon Cellular P'ship, Nos. 95-5214, 96-5000, 96- 
5001, 95-5213, 1996 WL 639882, at *8-9 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 1996); Kimball Assocs., P.A. v. Homer 
Cent Sch. Dist., No. oo-CV-897 (HGMXGJD), 2000 WL 172075 1, at *7 (N.D.N.Y Nov. 9, 2000); 
Universal Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 95 Civ. 8436 (WHP), 1999 WL 
77I3S7, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1999). 
79 See, e.g., Fairbrook Leasing, Inc. v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 408 F.3d 460, 465-67 (8th Cir. 
2005); Lazard Freres & Co. v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 108 F.3d 1531, 1544-46 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Hostcentric Techs., Inc. v. Republic Thunderbolt, LLC, No. 04 Civ. 162 1 (KMW), 2005 WL 
1377853, at *4-io (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2005); Weinreich v. Sandhaus, 850 F. Supp. 1169, 1176-78 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 175 B.R. 438, 503-05 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
80 See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 86, 94-96, 102, 112, 1 18-19. The preliminary agreement 
cases include those in which the court enforced the agreements as binding preliminary commit- 
ments, as well as those in which the court held that there were sufficient factual issues raised to 
preclude summary judgment. 
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The cases indicate that parties often reach substantial agreement 
before they make reliance investments. Parties can agree on most 
terms but postpone the costs of drafting the contract documents and 
specifying the remaining terms; in this way, the parties protect heir 
expectation i terest because, by signaling their intent o be bound, they 
make what the courts describe as a fully binding agreement enforce- 
able according to its terms.81 Alternatively, parties may make their 
agreement subject to conditions precedent such that the promisor has 
no duty to perform unless stated exogenous events occur.82 A common 
example in financing agreements is the required approval of a third 
party such as a corporate board as a condition precedent to perform- 
ance. Finally, in a number of cases, parties ign comfort agreements 
that specifically state that they are nonbinding.83 In these cases, par- 
ties appear to rely on trust contracts to protect early investment.84 All 
of these examples suggest that parties have available to them, and 
commonly use, various formal and informal contractual methods for 
protecting early reliance investments. 
The precontractual reliance problem does arise, however, in a sig- 
nificant number of cases. As we explain in Part II, in the absence of 
any agreement, courts generally deny claims for recovery of reliance 
costs regardless of the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff.85 
Moreover, even if a court finds a preliminary agreement sufficient to
sustain an obligation to bargain in good faith, the defendant is still 
able to exit the negotiations without liability in a number of in- 
stances.86 The courts' reluctance to award damages in these cases may 
rest partly on the parties' ability to protect early reliance themselves 
by using alternative contractual mechanisms. The cases thus raise the 
question why parties sometimes fail to use these options. 
The model in Part III provides an answer, and the case data offer 
some support for those conclusions. In twenty-five of the thirty-one 
81 In every case in which the parties expressly stated their intention to be bound, the court en- 
forced the contract as a fully binding agreement. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Tobin, 706 N.E.2d 629, 
632 (Mass. 1999). 
82 See, e.g., Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 215-16 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Cleveland Wrecking Co. v. Hercules Constr. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 287, 298-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); 
United Magazine Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
83 See, e.g., Missigman v. USI Ne., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 495, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
84 For a discussion of the self-enforcement of deliberately incomplete or indefinite agreements, 
see Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 
(2003). 
85 No plaintiff in our sample recovered reliance losses when the court found there was no 
agreement. 
86 See, e.g., A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Group, 
Inc., 873 F.2d 155, 160 (7th Cir. 1989); Tan v. Allwaste, Inc., No. 96 C 3558, 1997 WL 337207, at 
*4 (N.D. 111. June 1 1, 1997); Kandel v. Ctr. for Urological TVeatment & Research, P.C., No. M2000- 
O2128-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 598567, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2002). 
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cases in which the promisee argued with at least some success that a 
preliminary agreement bound the promisor to bargain in good faith, 
the investment patterns of the parties fit the commercial behavior de- 
scribed in the model. In particular, the parties had made a prelimi- 
nary agreement that committed them to make simultaneous but incho- 
ate relation-specific investments. The reported facts also suggest hat 
the parties' investments became more tangible as the parties made 
them and as uncertainty was resolved. Finally, attempts at ex post re- 
negotiation failed, apparently because one party delayed its investment 
or wished to exit the deal while the other did not. The other six cases 
either did not provide nough factual background for us to determine 
the pattern of the parties' investments orreflected substantial confu- 
sion by the court about the nature of the transaction and the applica- 
ble law. 
We can better explain the contractual complexity problem that mo- 
tivates these preliminary agreements by grouping the twenty-five in- 
vesting cases into two broad categories: investments injoint ventures, 
partnerships, and distributorships, and corporate financing invest- 
ments uch as acquisitions and capital financing deals.87 While these 
case groupings represent quite different commercial patterns, the com- 
plexity of the transaction is the factual element hat best explains the 
parties' use of preliminary agreements in both categories. 
B. Joint Ventures, Partnerships, and Distributorships 
An exemplar of the first investment pattern is Kandel v. Center for 
Urological Treatment & Research, RC.88 In Kandel, a doctor moved 
his practice and his family from New York to Tennessee to join a phy- 
sician's group. Dr. Kandel and the Center entered into an employment 
agreement providing that Dr. Kandel would work for one year, after 
which the parties would "negotiate in good faith" to permit him to 
purchase stock in the group.89 At the year's end, the parties negotiated 
87 Eleven cases involved investments in joint ventures, partnerships, or distributorships, and 
the other fourteen concerned investments in financing projects. 
88 2002 WL 598567. 
89 Id. at *i (internal quotation marks omitted). The contract included the following provision: 
10. Agreement to Negotiate in Good Faith Toward Purchase of Equity Ownership. 
The Employer agrees that in the event Employee remains continuously employed by 
Employer for a period of one (1) year and has achieved Board Certification through the 
American Board of Urology, Employer will negotiate in good faith with Employee to al- 
low Employee to purchase from Employer that number of shares of Employer's stock 
which will permit Employee to own the same number of shares as the stockholder hold- 
ing the most shares of Employer's stock at that time. Employer anticipates that the pur- 
chase price of such stock shall be based on the GAAP book value of the Employer as of 
the date of the purchase. 
Id. (second emphasis added) (quoting the contract between Dr. Kandel and the Center). 
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but reached an impasse over the financial terms of the partnership.90 
Subsequently, negotiations ceased and the Center fired Dr. Kandel.91 
He filed suit against the Center and its principals, alleging that the de- 
fendants had breached their contract o negotiate in good faith and 
committed promissory fraud in inducing him to sign the employment 
agreement. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both counts, holding 
that even if Tennessee recognized a cause of action for breach of an 
agreement to bargain in good faith, the evidence did not demonstrate 
such a breach and did not establish promissory fraud.92 
In this case, both parties undertook to make simultaneous invest- 
ments. The Center agreed to make a human capital investment inon- 
the-job training and access to proprietary information. Dr. Kandel 
agreed to move to the new practice and make a human capital invest- 
ment in treating a new set of patients and in learning the defendant's 
practice. He was to be paid for the portion of his investment that was 
contractible - moving costs and salary - but not for his opportunity 
costs or for his human capital contribution. The expected surplus 
from both parties' investments was the marginal increase in the profits 
from adding Dr. Kandel to the partnership. This surplus was not con- 
tractible ex ante. However, at the end of the year, and in consequence 
of both parties' investment, the surplus probably would be sufficiently 
tangible for the parties to divide in a renegotiation.93 
In Kandel, the preliminary agreement was motivated in important 
part by asymmetric information: Dr. Kandel had private information 
about his ability, and the partnership had private information about its 
profitability. The parties' investments would reveal enough informa- 
tion to make their project angible and, hence, contractible. The par- 
ties appeared to function in a complex environment inwhich a profit- 
able project may have taken many forms, and the form of the 
particular profitable project, if any, was unknown ex ante. 
This pattern of preliminary agreements motivated by complexity 
appears in a number of cases in the sample. For example, inchoate- 
ness that results from complexity is reflected in a joint venture to 
manufacture clothing that required simultaneous investments by the 
seller in manufacturing capacity and by the buyer in human and fi- 
90 See id. at *2 ("The parties agreed on many terms of the buy-in, such as the formula to be 
used in determining the amount of Dr. Kandel's compensation . . . and the terms of the covenant 
not to compete. . . . The parties disagreed, however, on the method for calculating the stock re- 
demption value."). 
91 Id. at*3. 
92 See id. at *7-8. 
93 Tangible evidence of the partnership's gain would include the accounts receivable generated 
by Dr. Kandel in the practice as compared with those generated by his peers, evaluations of his 
performance by patients and other professionals, and the like. 
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nancial capital,94 a joint venture to establish a cellular telephone net- 
work requiring simultaneous investments in securing FCC approvals 
and in constructing a prototype,95 and a distribution agreement for 
a new product in which the distributor agreed to invest in finding 
sales locations and the manufacturer agreed to secure financing and 
approvals.96 
The outcomes in these cases are often consistent with the recom- 
mendations that our model supports. Kandel is illustrative. Dr. Kan- 
del, like the buyer in the model, took a risk. He could have been sub- 
jected to holdup after he moved and began to work if the practice 
group had delayed its investment. But if the practice group antici- 
pated that a court would require reimbursement of Dr. KandePs veri- 
fiable reliance costs should the group delay its investment, he group 
would have been motivated to honor its commitment toinvest simul- 
taneously. Anticipating the group's likely behavior, Dr. Kandel would 
have invested efficiently. Even so, Dr. Kandel would have borne a fur- 
ther risk that, once uncertainty was resolved, his opportunity cost 
of performing as a partner in the practice exceeded the value of his 
services to the firm. In that case, trade would be inefficient expost. 
Dr. Kandel, if he were sophisticated, would have relocated and joined 
the practice group temporarily if he expected trade to be efficient 
ex post given the group's appropriate simultaneous investment. The 
law, however, should not give him reason to believe that he would 
have been compensated if the group did what it should have but his 
prediction turned out to be wrong. Thus, denying him damages was 
correct.97 
Many courts also focus on evidence of a delay in making a simulta- 
neous investment as the key condition for establishing a breach by the 
promisor of a duty to negotiate in good faith. A case in point is In re 
Matterhorn Group, Inc.98 In this case, Swatch wanted to expand its 
franchise operations to sell watches in the United States. Matterhorn 
and Swatch signed a letter of intent granting Matterhorn the exclusive 
franchise for a list of possible locations. The agreement called for 
Matterhorn to invest in finding appropriate locations for retailing 
Swatch watches from among thirty possible sites. As Matterhorn filed 
94 See Southwick Clothing LLC v. GFT (USA) Corp., No. 99 CV 10452 (GBD), 2004 WL 
2914093, at *i-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2004). The human capital investments included the due dili- 
gence undertaken by the prospective buyer of the manufacturing capacity. Id. at *4. 
95 See Ward v. PriCellular Corp., No. 90 Civ. 5214 (MGC), 1991 WL 64043, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 16, 1 991). 
96 See In re Matterhorn Group, Inc., No. 97-8273 (SMB), 2002 WL 31528396, at *2-4 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002). 
97 The court in Kandel found no bad faith. The facts tend to support the inference that trade 
was inefficient ex post. 
9» 2002 WL 31528396. 
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applications for franchises at potentially profitable locations, Swatch 
agreed to process the applications diligently and to seek financing and 
approval from its parent firm." Here again, the parties agreed to 
make a simultaneous investment ina complex project: Swatch was to 
invest in opportunity costs by granting exclusive rights to Matterhorn 
and in the human capital needed to process applications and to be- 
come familiar with the American business climate; Matterhorn was to 
make human capital investments insearch and information costs. The 
project - establishing retail sites for selling Swatch watches in shop- 
ping malls - could have taken many possible forms, and precisely 
what form would be profitable could not be specified ex ante. Invest- 
ment and the passage of time would have revealed which sites, if any, 
would prove profitable. 
In this case, however, Swatch engaged in the strategic behavior 
that our model predicts: it delayed processing several applications and 
failed to secure the necessary approvals. The court found Swatch to 
be in breach of a preliminary agreement to bargain in good faith100 
and awarded Matterhorn reliance damages based on the out-of-pocket 
costs of investigating the locations in question. The court denied Mat- 
terhorn 's claim for expectation damages based on lost profits, holding 
that "there is no guarantee that it would have opened a store in [that 
location]."101 
The result in Matterhorn was correct because, absent a legal rule 
protecting Matterhorn 's reliance cost, a rational party in Matterhorn 's 
position would anticipate the risk of ex post holdup and could decline 
to make the efficient investment. Entering into a written preliminary 
agreement should have legally committed Swatch to invest as prom- 
ised and to reimburse Matterhorn 's reliance costs if it did not. The 
decision did ultimately protect Matterhorn 's reliance interest, but the 
requirement that the parties bargain in good faith was unnecessary. 
99 Seeid.at*i-A. 
100 The court held: 
The rejection of the Vail application violated the Letter of Intent. The Letter of In- 
tent granted Matterhorn the exclusive right to negotiate a lease in Vail despite Vail's 
geographical distance from Matterhorn 's base of operation in the Northeast. Further- 
more, it required Swatch to review the Vail application in good faith .... [Swatch] uni- 
laterally rescinded the exclusivity that the Letter of Intent had granted, and Swatch's 
[decision] to reject the Vail application was improper. 
In addition, Matterhorn sent the Vail letter of intent in late April 1996. . . . Swatch 
took four months to complete its processing of the application. . . . 
Accordingly, Swatch breached the Letter of Intent by rejecting the Vail application 
for improper easons. 
Id. at * 1 6- 1 7 (footnote omitted). 
101 Id. at*i7. 
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C. Acquisitions, Venture Capital, and Secured Debt 
The existence of preliminary agreements is less obvious in the sec- 
ond prototype we explore: capital financing through acquisitions, se- 
cured lending, or venture capital participations. Nevertheless, a close 
analysis of these cases reveals a similar commercial pattern. We dis- 
cuss two examples: simultaneous investment by both parties followed 
by one party's decision to exit, and delayed investment by one party 
followed by its refusal to negotiate further. 
An example of the former behavior is illustrated by Tan v. Allwaste, 
Inc. 102 In Tan, the plaintiffs were shareholders of Geotrack, a firm en- 
gaged in subsurface utility engineering. Allwaste considered acquiring 
Geotrack.103 The parties executed a letter of intent providing that "the 
closing of the purchase was contingent on a 'satisfactory review ' of 
Geotrack 's financial statements and its operational practices."104 The 
letter bound the parties to pursue a deal in good faith.105 During the 
due diligence investigation, Allwaste "discovered Geotrack had not 
remitted payroll and withholding taxes to the Internal Revenue Service 
for some time."106 Allwaste withdrew from further negotiations and 
was unwilling to buy Geotrack even after Geotrack 's shareholders of- 
fered to lower the price.107 
The simultaneous investment model helps explain the use of pre- 
liminary agreements to support such acquisition projects. In this 
situation, the buyer invests in information costs by undertaking due 
diligence, and he will be protected if he negotiates for an exclusive 
dealing clause according to which the seller agrees not to shop for a 
better deal during negotiations. Thus, the seller makes an opportunity 
cost investment.108 This investment and the passage of time together 
indicate whether a profitable project exists, and they permit the parties 
to write a contract o pursue it. 
In Tan, the court analyzed the letter of intent not as a fully binding 
contract for Allwaste to acquire Geotrack, but as a preliminary agree- 
ment obligating Allwaste to negotiate further in good faith. The court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to conclude that Allwaste backed out of the deal for 
reasons unrelated to Geotrack 's actions, omissions, or financial 
102 No. 96 C 3558, 1997 WL 337207 (N.D. 111. June 11, 1997). 
103 Id. at*i. 
104 Id. (quoting the letter of intent). 
1Q5 Id. at *4. 
J06 Id.sit*2. 
™ Id. 
108 Sellers also sometimes invest in integration. See Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Under- 
standing MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 335 (2005). 
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status.109 The court thus denied, in relevant part, Allwaste Js motion 
for summary judgment.110 There was no evidence of delay in invest- 
ment, however, such as a failure to undertake due diligence pending 
the resolution of uncertainty. Rather, the evidence suggests that All- 
waste found the deal to be inefficient ex post owing to exogenous cir- 
cumstances. Under these conditions, exposing Allwaste to the threat of 
a jury finding of bad faith could have motivated inefficient trade ex 
post or the refusal to enter into potentially profitable negotiations.111 
Therefore, on this understanding of the facts, the decision in Tan was 
incorrect. 
Contrast the commercial behavior in Tan with the behavior in 
JamSports & Entertainment, LLC v. Paradama Productions, Inc.112 
JamSports, a sporting events promoter, sued AMA Pro Racing for 
breaching an agreement that would have given JamSports the right to 
produce and promote the AMA Supercross Series from 2003 to 2009. 
The parties had signed a letter of intent obligating AMA to negotiate 
with JamSports exclusively and in good faith for ninety days regarding 
a promotion agreement.113 The letter of intent contemplated a simul- 
taneous investment by both parties. AMA was to invest opportunity 
costs by committing to the exclusivity period, and JamSports under- 
109 See Tan, 1997 WL 337207, at *4. In particular, the plaintiffs noted that the acquisition of 
Geotrack was to be debt free, so Geotrack's tax liability should not have affected Allwaste 's 
analysis of the deal. The plaintiffs also provided evidence that Allwaste had simply decided not 
to conduct any more acquisitions. Id. 
no Id. 
111 Even without a jury verdict, the cost of a trial will likely motivate a defendant in Allwaste 's 
position to settle, and the anticipated costs of settlement may deter efficient exit thereafter. 
112 336 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. 111. 2004). 
113 Id. at 828. The relevant portions of the letter of intent read as follows: 
AMA Pro Racing, owner of the Supercross Series, and JamSports hereby express 
their intent to enter into an agreement to promote AMA Supercross events and under- 
take related sales and marketing matters. . . 
1. Framework. AMA Pro Racing and JamSports shall agree to produce and pro- 
mote not less than fourteen (14) and up to a mutually agreed upon number of AMA Su- 
percross events per season (currently January 1 through the first week of May) for a 
seven (7) year period beginning January 1, 2003, with an opportunity to extend the term 
based on criteria such as operating issues, financial issues, brand development and event 
attendance and such other criteria s to be further clarified by the parties hereto. . . 
13. Exclusivity. Each of the parties agrees that for a period of ninety (90) days af- 
ter the date this letter is fully executed by the parties hereto . . . , AMA Pro Racing and 
JamSports shall negotiate exclusively and in good faith with one another, and neither 
party shall enter into any discussion or negotiations with any third party with respect to 
the subject matter hereof. If a party hereto shall receive any offer from a third party 
with respect to the subject matter hereof, the receiving party shall promptly notify the 
other party hereto of the offer, the name of the offeror and the terms thereof. The par- 
ties shall use their best efforts, negotiating in good faith, to enter into the Promotion 
Agreement within thirty (30) days from the date this letter is fully executed by the par- 
ties hereto. 
Id. at 828-29 (first and second omissions in original) (quoting the letter of intent). 
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took to invest in developing a marketing plan for the Supercross series. 
The price JamSports was to pay for promotion rights depended upon 
the outcome of both investments. During the agreement's exclusivity 
period, Clear Channel, a competing promoter, sent letters to AMA's 
board of directors indicating that Clear Channel wanted to continue 
negotiations for the AMA contract.114 AMA failed to disclose this 
proposal to JamSports, and AMA ultimately entered into a promo- 
tional agreement with Clear Channel.115 
JamSports alleged that AMA breached the preliminary agreement 
by entertaining a competing proposal while negotiations were ongoing. 
The court held that the letter of intent was a binding preliminary 
commitment tonegotiate in good faith and that JamSports had estab- 
lished as a matter of law that AMA breached its exclusivity obligation 
by failing to advise JamSports of its receipt of the Clear Channel pro- 
posal. The court also held that AMA's insistence on having its parent 
entity approve the deal, a condition that did not conform to the pre- 
liminary agreement, was a breach of the duty of good faith if put forth 
with "bad intent."116 
JamSports illustrates the uncertain grasp that courts exhibit con- 
cerning just what behavior constitutes a bad faith failure to negotiate. 
AMA behaved strategically in the way our model predicts: it delayed 
its opportunity cost investment and entertained Clear Channel's pro- 
posal without informing JamSports. As it happened, the delay paid off 
for AMA: it was able to negotiate a profitable deal with Clear Chan- 
nel. The court correctly held that this behavior constituted a breach of 
AMA's duty to negotiate in good faith and allowed JamSports to prove 
its reliance losses at trial.117 
But the court's further holding that it was a per se violation of the 
duty of good faith for AMA, with "bad intent," to insist on new condi- 
114 Id. at 830. 
115 Id. at 832, 847. 
116 Id. at 848. Specifically, the court stated that "AMA Pro's insistence on material contractual 
terms or conditions beyond those stated in the letter of intent could constitute a breach of its con- 
tractual duty to negotiate in good faith." Id. However, the court concluded: 
[T]he fact that AMA Pro insisted upon a significant condition that was not included in 
the letter of intent [was] not by itself sufficient o demonstrate AMA Pro's lack of good 
faith. The concept of good faith appears also to require an inquiry into the breaching 
party's intent. As one Illinois court noted in a different context, a "practical, common- 
sense construction" of good faith is the absence of bad faith or bad intent. 
Id. at 848 (quoting Dotson v. Former S 'holders of Abraham Lincoln Land & Cattle Co., 773 
N.E.2d 792, 801 (111. App. Ct. 2002)); see also id. at 847 ("For instance, a party might breach its 
obligation to bargain in good faith by unreasonably insisting on a condition outside the scope of 
the parties' preliminary agreement, especially where such insistence is a thinly disguised pretext 
for scotching the deal because of an unfavorable change in market conditions." (quoting A/S Apo- 
thekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Group, Inc., 873 F.2d 155, 158 
(7th Cir. iq8q)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
117 See id. at 847-49. 
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tions during the negotiations is questionable. Parties make preliminary 
agreements in considerable part because they do not know ex ante just 
which project from the set of potential projects will turn out to be 
profitable. If there is a profitable project, the parties will then propose 
to each other a number of conditions that will advance the pursuit of 
just that project. Thus, AMA likely would have proposed new condi- 
tions to JamSports even if it had invested in the exclusivity period, and 
those conditions could have included the approval of its parent. The 
court's holding that introducing a new condition with "bad intent" 
was per se bad faith without limiting it to specific situations thus re- 
flected a basic misunderstanding of how parties move from prelimi- 
nary agreements to final deals. To be sure, there would have been 
bad faith if AMA had insisted on a new condition as a pretext o sup- 
port its breach, but other situations do not warrant he "bad faith" 
categorization. 
In sum, our data suggest hat modern courts have an intuitive un- 
derstanding that roughly correlates with the normative conclusions 
that we formally derive. Courts recognize that they have a role to play 
in enforcing preliminary agreements. Enforcement of these agree- 
ments can motivate a party to invest in an ex ante efficient project de- 
spite the fear of being held up should the other party delay his own 
investment. The cases consistently find that a preliminary agreement, 
which creates a duty to bargain in good faith, has or reasonably may 
have been breached when there is a delay in undertaking a promised 
investment.118 Moreover, courts also enforce preliminary agreements 
when the promisor, after delaying her own investment, determines that 
the deal will be ex post inefficient and exits. Although the project is 
inefficient expost, the delaying party should compensate the investing 
party for verifiable reliance costs. 
The courts also appear to have an intuitive grasp of the necessary 
conditions for finding a preliminary agreement. Consistent with our 
model, courts generally find preliminary agreements when the parties 
have agreed on the nature of their project, on the nature of the in- 
vestment actions that each is committed to undertake, and on the or- 
der in which these actions are to be pursued.119 This baseline for find- 
118 See, e.g.. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Ormesa Geothermal, 791 F. Supp. 401, 
406 (S.D.N.Y. 1 991) (holding as a matter of law that a delay was a breach of the duty to bargain 
in good faith); In re Matterhorn Group, Inc., No. 97-8273 (SMB), 2002 WL 31528396, at *i6-i7 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002) (same); see also L-3 Commc'ns Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., No. 02 
Civ. 9144 (DC), 2005 WL 712232, at *4~5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2005) (finding a jury question 
whether the alleged delay was a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith); Scher v. Llorente, 
No. 92 Civ. 5206 (MBM), 1993 WL 426840, at *3~5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1993) (same). 
119 See, e.g., Frazier Indus., L.L.C. v. Gen. Fasteners Co., 137 F. App'x 723, 730-32 (6th Cir. 
2005); A/S Apothekernes, 873 F.2d at 160; L-3 Commc'ns, 2005 WL 712232, at *7-8; Bacou-Dalloz 
USA, Inc. v. Cont'l Polymers, Inc., No. CA 00-404-T, 2005 WL 615752, at *7-n (D.R.I. Mar. 4, 
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ing an actionable commitment is independent of many of the factors 
that have been made doctrinally salient, such as the number of open 
terms and the extent of part performance.120 
The problem revealed by the cases, however, is that no matter how 
sharp the intuitions of experienced judges are, the lack of a theory that 
can explain the underlying commercial behavior inevitably leads to er- 
rors. First, there is no need for a duty to bargain in good faith: award- 
ing reliance is sufficient to increase efficiency. Second, the duty to 
bargain in good faith may be unhelpful since courts will sometimes 
misapply it. For example, the court in Tan permitted the jury to find 
bad faith even when there was no evidence of investment delay and 
even when the deal apparently would have been inefficient for All- 
waste to pursue. And in JamSports, a party that breached its obliga- 
tion to bargain in good faith by delaying investment was also subject 
to a possible independent finding of bad faith based on the introduc- 
tion of new conditions during renegotiation. The lesson, in short, is 
that theory matters. The cases often make sense when one addresses 
the right questions to them. But absent a theory, even the wisest 
judges err. 
V. Conclusion 
Parties often make relation-specific investments on the basis of pre- 
liminary understandings with the intention of formalizing their rela- 
tionship later. These investments are lost when the contemplated deal 
turns out to be unprofitable. In some no-deal cases, a promisee who 
has sunk costs comes to believe that the promisor treated him unfairly. 
The promisee was induced to invest by the promisor's assurances, but 
these assurances were not kept; instead, the promisor either abandoned 
the deal or attempted to exploit the promisee in a renegotiation. This 
behavioral pattern has produced hundreds of appellate cases in the last 
decade alone. It also has been the object of substantial case law and 
considerable scholarly commentary for an even longer period of time. 
Litigation explosions occur in transactional fields uch as contracts 
when the law is obscure, and the law is obscure here. In contrast o 
the reigning scholarly view, we first show that courts will not award 
reliance damages unless the parties had settled on sufficient material 
terms to support an inference that they wanted legal weight to attach 
2005); JamSports, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 846; Missigman v. USI Ne., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 26. 495, 509-10 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Spencer TVask Sec, Inc. v. FinancialWeb.com, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9197 (RCC), 
2000 WL 1239101, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000); United Magazine Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 
877 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Scher, 1993 WL 426840, at *ss; In re Stahl, No 98- 
49054 (REG), 2002 WL 31557297, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2002); cases cited supra note 35. 
120 See supra pp. 675-76. 
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to their preliminary agreement. Understanding this rule, however, is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for providing parties and courts 
with useful guidance. Substantial confusion remains regarding just 
how complete a preliminary agreement must be to justify enforcement 
and just what remedies for breach are appropriate. Indeed, because 
litigated eals commonly are ex post inefficient, the parties could not 
have agreed on a complete contract o pursue them. Therefore, it is 
difficult o envision what behavior would constitute a wrongful 
breach. 
Disputes continue to arise because the foundational questions of in- 
tention and remedy are poorly understood. The initial task, then, is to 
understand why parties sometimes conclude only preliminary agree- 
ments, make sunk-cost investments under conditions of uncertainty, 
and sue each other over deals that they could never have contracted to 
pursue. We create a model that attempts to answer these questions. It 
shows that commercial parties sometimes maximize expected surplus 
by beginning projects that, while promising, are too complex to de- 
scribe in formal contracts. The parties nevertheless understand what 
their project will be, what the primary responsibilities of each will be, 
and the rough order in which their contributions will be made. Com- 
mencing to invest in such a potential project may produce two types of 
gains: accelerating the realization of returns if the project turns out to 
be profitable, and illuminating which, if any, of the possible projects 
will be profitable, which in turn makes an efficient project sufficiently 
tangible to describe in a formal contract. 
Typically, there are incentives for parties to engage in strategic be- 
havior when, as in the situations we discuss, little is written down, the 
behavior of a contract partner is difficult to observe, and the state of 
the world is uncertain. Strategic behavior in our model takes a par- 
ticular form: a party who agrees to invest when her partner invests 
will delay investment tosee how things turn out. Delay has two ad- 
vantages. If the deal turns out to be unprofitable, the party who de- 
lays will not have sunk costs in the project. If the project turns out to 
be profitable and the parties renegotiate to set a price, the faithful 
party's sunk costs will be ignored in the new bargain, but the unfaith- 
ful party will be compensated for costs she must incur to make the 
project successful. As usual, the main inefficiency is ex ante: a party 
who anticipates such strategic behavior will decline to make the pre- 
liminary agreement, and potentially efficient projects will be forgone. 
These conclusions how that the facilitative role for courts is 
somewhat broader than has previously been appreciated. Courts en- 
courage efficient investment by enforcing contracts, and they encour- 
age the exploration of investment opportunities by not protecting the 
expectation interest of parties disappointed by the failure to reach 
agreement. We show here that courts have a further facilitative role: 
to encourage xploration of investment opportunities by protecting the 
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promisee's verifiable reliance when the promisor strategically delays 
investment and thus breaches an ex ante efficient agreement to pursue 
a potentially profitable deal. Anticipating the availability of a reliance 
recovery can motivate parties to sink costs in the exploration of possi- 
bly profitable ventures and thus will expand the set of efficient con- 
tracts that parties can create. 
This analysis should help courts for three significant reasons. First, 
it shows what must be settled for there to be an actionable preliminary 
agreement: he parties must agree on the type of project, such as a 
shopping center or a financing; on an imprecise but workable division 
of authority for investment behavior; and on the rough order in which 
their actions are to be taken. These three conditions are each neces- 
sary and together sufficient.121 Second, the analysis clarifies that a de- 
viation from the agreed investment sequence is a breach. Third, it 
recognizes that the law has two related goals: to deter strategic behav- 
ior and to encourage investment. These goals are advanced by award- 
ing the faithful party her verifiable reliance costs if the other has 
wrongfully delayed investment. There is no need to protect the pro- 
misee's expectation, which would be difficult to do in any event for 
projects that never get past the preliminary stage. 
We test our analysis against a large sample of reported cases. The 
sample offers some evidence that parties are motivated in the ways we 
identify and breach for the reasons we uncover. Reported cases pro- 
vide a weak foundation for empirical conclusions, but they should be 
taken as persuasive initial evidence when the theory is plausible and 
there is little competing evidence. The cases also show that some 
courts respond as if they were attempting to implement our policy 
proposal. In particular, these courts award reliance damages to pro- 
misees if the promisors breached the preliminary agreement and failed 
to bargain in good faith over exit conditions. Our analysis indicates 
that although awarding reliance damages for the breach of a prelimi- 
nary agreement is efficient, imposing a further duty that parties should 
bargain over the remaining terms in good faith is unnecessary. To the 
extent hat courts continue to impose the duty to bargain in good faith 
before preliminary deals are abandoned, we make the duty more con- 
crete by specifying what the parties should bargain about: they should 
discuss the content of the preliminary agreement, whether there was a 
breach, and what the damages should be, but they need not bargain 
about whether to pursue the project. 
121 The rule we propose is only a default. Parties who are concerned that a court may award 
reliance too frequently, even if it uses the criteria for a preliminary agreement that we develop, 
can contract out by stating that no liability will attach to any statements or representations unless 
they are included in a formal written contract. 
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Our analysis also shows that courts sometimes make mistakes, 
however, either by not enforcing preliminary agreements or by adopt- 
ing an imprecise and overly broad definition of bad faith when they do 
enforce them. Thus, our primary contribution is normative: we offer a
framework for treating early reliance cases that, we argue, would im- 
prove efficiency if courts were to adopt it. 
Appendix 
In this Appendix, we consider whether awarding a buyer his verifi- 
able costs when the seller breaches an agreement to invest simultane- 
ously can cause the buyer to overinvest. There is no analytic answer 
to this question: the buyer will overinvest for certain values of the 
relevant variables and will underinvest for others. We show by exam- 
ple that the buyer will underinvest unless the verifiable fraction of his 
costs is improbably large and the probability that the seller will breach 
is unrealistically high. 
Investment in our model is exploratory: the parties investigate 
whether they have a good project or not. Thus, it is natural to assume 
that an initial investment affects the probability that a successful pro- 
ject will turn up rather than the returns from the project itself; later 
investment will affect those returns. Formally, then, we assume that 
the probability of success p(xb, x) is a function of both parties' initial 
investments and is twice differentiable, nondecreasing in both vari- 






p>S^o dxbdxs (ii) 
Investment is efficient if p (xb, x) • S2S + (1 - p (xb, xj) • 0 - xb - xs > 0. 
To see that the buyer commonly will underinvest, first consider the 
buyer's expected return in the simultaneous regime: p(xb, x)SS I 2 - xb. 
Eliminating the discount factor for convenience, the buyer should in- 
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vest until the expected marginal return equals the marginal cost - 
that is, until p'b(xb, x)S = 1, but the buyer's actual first-order condition 
is p'b(xb,x)S 1 2 = 1. The buyer underin vests in the simultaneous re- 
gime because his marginal return is diminished by the seller's dis- 
counted share. The fraction 1 / 2 is the holdup tax. 
Now turn to the sequential regime and assume that the buyer can 
recover the verifiable portion of his investment costs. His return then 
is p (xb, x)(S2S - &c) I 2 - (1 - ocb)xb. Again eliminating the discount 
factor, the first-order condition is p'b (xb, x)(S2S - &c) I 2 = (1 - ocb)xb. 
The buyer recovers ab of his costs, so the term 1 - ab represents the 
portion he bears. The holdup tax - the left hand side - is higher in 
the sequential regime because the buyer's return is reduced by the 
seller's costs. The breach subsidy, however, offsets the buyer's incen- 
tive to underrely to some extent. 
We create an example to see whether the breach subsidy will cause 
the buyer to overinvest. In the example, the seller's costs reduce the 
expected surplus 5 by 20%, and in the sequential regime the holdup 
tax is 60%. Again, we ignore the discount rate for simplicity. The 
buyer thus would invest efficiently if the breach subsidy were 
p'b(xb, x)(0AS) = 1 - 0.6, or p'b(xb> x)S = 1. The buyer therefore would 
not overrely in the sequential regime on the assumed parameters 
unless ab exceeded 60%. For example, if ab were 0.75, then 
p'b(xb, x)(0AS) = 1 - 0.75, and therefore the buyer overinvests because 
pb (xb, x)S = 0.625. As for how much, the marginal dollar of revenue is 
reduced by the holdup tax, but the marginal dollar of cost is reduced 
by the breach subsidy. When the holdup tax is 60% and the breach 
subsidy is 75%, the buyer will overrely by the difference of 15%. 
The issue is not whether the buyer will invest too much in the se- 
quential regime. Rather, the issue is whether the buyer will overinvest 
after making a preliminary agreement to invest simultaneously and 
when his costs will be subsidized only if the seller breaches. In the si- 
multaneous regime, the buyer pays a holdup tax - his marginal return 
is reduced by 50% - and he must bear all of his costs. Suppose, then, 
that the buyer believes the seller will breach with a 25% probability. 
The net expected effect on the buyer's marginal dollar of investment is 
the expected value of the holdup tax when the seller complies and the 
expected value of the combination of the holdup tax and the breach 
subsidy when the seller breaches. In the example when ab = 0.75, the 
net expected effect is 0.25 • 0.15 + 0.75 • (-0.5) = -0.3375. The first 
term is the probability that the buyer would be in the sequential re- 
gime (0.25) multiplied by the net incentive to overrely in that regime 
(0.15); the second term is the probability that the buyer will be in the 
simultaneous regime (0.75) because the seller will comply multiplied by 
the incentive to underin vest as a result of the holdup tax (-0.5). The 
buyer will underrely because the net expected effect on his marginal 
incentive is negative. 
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In this example, when 75% of the buyer's costs are verifiable and 
the seller is expected to breach with a fairly high probability, the 
holdup tax still causes the buyer to underinvest by a substantial 
amount. This result makes intuitive sense because, in the sequential 
regime, the breach subsidy is offset by a large holdup tax while in the 
simultaneous regime, there is no subsidy and the holdup tax remains 
large. In addition, since a party is reluctant o deal with a partner 
who is likely to breach, the defection probability - the probability 
that the buyer will be in the sequential regime - commonly is much 
lower than 50%. For these reasons, the buyer puts much more weight 
on the simultaneous regime, in which he is not subsidized, than on the 
sequential regime, in which he is subsidized when the seller breaches. 
The net effect causes the buyer to underinvest. Thus, the breach sub- 
sidy we recommend can cause overinvestment only if an improbably 
large fraction of the buyer's costs are verifiable and the seller is ex- 
pected to breach an unrealistically high percentage of the time. 
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